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GW Discourse is proud to announce that the Spring issue is now available, both in print and on the Web. Thanks to the dedicated staff and writers who made this issue a reality. Enjoy!

When viewing Europe from across the Atlantic, it is easy to smirk at the fumbling of the European Union in reaction to Greece’s financial problems. Even if the Euro-zone is only across the channel, it is still quite easy to blame everything on the Germans. But when you are in the heart of the continent, the situation is nothing to laugh at. The situation in Greece is dire; not only would a Greek default result in violent civil unrest domestically, but market confidence throughout Europe could suffer. Other EU member states with high debt or stagnating economies, such as Portugal, could be hit by the waves of financial instability emanating from the Aegean. The Euro itself has already fallen in value. Supporting the restructuring of the Greek economy and restoring confidence in Greek bonds is not really about Greece – it is about the European Union.

Restoring confidence in Greece, and thereby the Euro, is certainly an issue for the whole EU. Yet, the necessity of talking about Greece in terms of the whole Union has, in turn, led to talking about the EU in terms of Germany. The unwillingness to contribute substantial funding to Greece without sufficient assurances – even including the potential sale of Greek islands – has once more put Germany in an unfavorable light. As the wealthiest EU member state and home to the European Central Bank, Germany has been criticized as inept, selfish and stingy. A delayed response has been attributed to the German desire for an impossible solution: saving Greece without spending money, while simultaneously punishing Greece without appearing to be a bully. This has led to a stalemate in relief negotiations, and the Germans seem to have just been wasting people’s time with their seemingly impossible demands.

But no longer – German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cabinet has agreed to contribute approximately $30 billion in loans to Greece as part of a larger agreement that was reached on Sunday. The plan, which was drafted by the International Monetary Firm (IMF), the European Commission and the European Central Bank (and Greece has agreed to), features €120 ($160) billion in financial aid from Euro-zone countries by 2012.  Over three years the IMF will contribute €27 ($36) billion, of which €15 ($19) billion will be available in the first year. Although the injection of funds should prevent the Greek crisis from becoming any worse, it is only one step in the process of recovery.

Over the coming months and years Greece will have to pass legislation to reform its economy. Among structural reform, the Greek government has already agreed to cut its budget by € 30 ($40) billion, which equates to about 13% of GDP.  Many of these cuts will come from lowering the salaries of government employees and reductions in social programs. In the face of distrust of not only the government, but also the IMF, the likelihood of further bouts of demonstrations and protests by a population with already-stretched pockets seems high.

In the meantime, the EU must determine what measures are necessary to prevent a future crisis of the same magnitude from breaking out in other member states. Stricter regulation and more conservative budgets are likely to come into favor – among just some of the policies for which Germany has a well-earned stereotype.

After decades of one-party democracy, the replacement of the Liberal Democratic Party with the opposition Democratic Party of Japan seemed like a welcome change to Japan’s ossified political system. Foreign and especially American commentators naturally focused on Prime Minister Hatoyama’s remarks about a more “equal” relationship between the United States and Japan. At the very least, this would mean a Japan that would calibrate its interests more towards regional interests, perhaps even leading to a nascent movement for integration.

However, as some skeptics predicted, the DPJ’s lack of experience governing would evince itself conspicuously in the conduct of its foreign affairs. An excellent post by “Curzon” at ComingAnarchy explains this (then contrarian) take on the DPJ’s foreign policy, with emphasis on the controversy over US base relocation in Okinawa – an issue that the LDP is now hammering the DPJ with. Simultaneously, the DPJ’s constituents do not want to see the DPJ renege on its promise to get the base out. Hatoyama has roughly a month to resolve the basing issue – if he does not, or if he cannot do so in a way satisfactory to the electorate and the United States, he may be in trouble at the polls. Already he is facing trouble between pursuing his government’s center-left economic agenda and placating business interests that may prove critical in upcoming elections. With the basing deadline, however, Hatoyama has made Okinawa the critical issue of his political career.

Two issues make the basing of US forces in Japan a vital political question. The first is Japan’s “pacifist” status. Though Japan’s economic woes and the defeat of the LDP provided a momentary interruption to this trend, the string of LDP Prime Ministers in the 2000s, particularly Koizumi, Abe, and Aso, demonstrated consistent interest in normalizing Japan’s foreign and defense policy. One might interpret the more independent streak in Hatoyama and the DPJ’s rhetoric as another facet of this drive to make Japan a “normal” nation. Today, however, Japan is not a normal nation, especially relative to the defense capabilities it could maintain and the region it occupies*. The Chinese naval exercises near Okinawa could probably not have come at a worse time for Hatoyama.

For all the DPJ’s forward-looking views on regional cooperation and its reasonable corrective to the perceived errors of LDP foreign policy, the truth remains that America is key to Japanese defense and its most critical partner on regional security issues in a part of the world where the potential for war lingers – and balancing diplomatic and domestic politics will not prove easy. If, on top of its economic troubles, the DPJ cannot find a solution pleasing to both its political base and the supporters of Futenma, then this exception to Japan’s one-party democracy may prove short-lived.

*  Consider that Japan spends something like 0.8% of GDP on defense. Were Japan to raise defense spending to a “normal” level, say 2%, it might well match China’s defense spending or surpass it. Of course, given Japan’s economic problems, the enormous unresolved historical grievances virtually all East Asian countries harbor towards it, and the potentially destabilizing effect of such defense increases, this would not make prudent policy. But it is worth remembering that Japan has relatively low material or technical obstacles to overcome should it desire a real aircraft carrier or nuclear weapons.

                This coming Thursday, the second UK general election debate is to be held in Bristol, where Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the Labour Party, David Cameron of the Conservatives  and Nick Clegg of the Liberal Democrats will engage the slated topic of international affairs. This makes for some jollygood programme-ing on the telly for those interested in where each of the men seek to lead a country that is still defined more than anything else by its epic post-imperial hangover. There are, broadly speaking, two overarching and at times sharply competing issues in British foreign policy that Her Majesty’s governments have faced since the end of empire (if you don’t count gorgeous little scraps like Bermuda or Turks and Caicos). Actually, the two issues can be narrowed to one: should Britain be a more integral part of the EU and the European integrationist consensus, or should it retain an independent identity of partner/”special relationship” member with the group of imperial descendants Churchill called  “the English-speaking peoples”—the American superpower and the Dominion countries  of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Consulting the IR section of each of the parties’ official election manifestos reveals some telling differences.     

                The Liberal Democrats are far and away the most Eurocentric, and (after more than half the chapter devoted to climate change and developing world aid) talk about placing Britain “at the heart of Europe”  to the point of eventually adopting the Euro. This would replace the “subservient and dangerous” relationship with the United States that drags Britain into things like the “illegal” invasion of Iraq. Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent of Trident submarines should also be abandoned. The contrast with the Conservatives could not be greater, who spend a large portion of their IR section on support for and reform in the military, then enumerate foreign policy points indicative of a vision for the UK as and independent global power. Here is found a list describing factors behind that power, like being “a global trading nation,” having “a leading role in NATO,” being “home to the world’s pre-eminent language” and commanding “armed forces that are the envy of the world.” Britain under a Tory government would pursue a “new special relationship with India,” engage China while “standing firm for human rights,” and push to widen UN Security Council membership, among other “hard-headed and practical” ideas”. It seems these people would love to run America, if “a strong, close and frank relationship with the United States” were not mentioned. The most animated part of the Tory chapter concerns the idea of a European Union that should be “an association of its member states” rather than “a federal Europe” of which Britain should not be a part. The Labor government’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty without a referendum was “a betrayal democratic traditions” and no more powers—let alone the British pound—should be transferred to Brussels. On the contrary, “the steady and unaccountable intrusion of the EU into every aspect of our lives has gone to far” and certain EU powers on criminal justice and social legislation should return to London.

                Compared to its challengers, Labour’s approach is more nuanced and less decisive either way. The ruling party derides the Tories’ Euroskepticism as “sullen resistance and disengagement that achieve nothing” and talks about positioning the UK to “lead” a Europe that “engages bilaterally” with the world’s other major powers and enhances its economic competitiveness with continued enlargement and certain internal reforms (infrastructure, financial regulation agriculture). No mention of America or the “special relationship” is made outside a passage criticizing the “poverty of the Tory vision” which presents a “false choice between an alliance with the United States and one with Europe.” Such an outlook would make a Prime Minister Cameron “isolated in the EU” to an extent that damagingly “undermines British influence.” Certainly no mention of Iraq exists at all—in contrast to a lengthy discourse on the importance of the Afghan mission and how the current government plans on ensuring success there, along with military funding pledges that include maintenance of the nuclear deterrent. The remaining space is devoted to passages hailing Labour’s commitments to foreign development, and reforming global institutions like the UN and the World Bank.

Though it has been weeks since the ROKS Cheonan disaster, the ship’s wreck was recently raised and examined. Though ROK officials initially denied explanations from hostile action in order to reduce tensions with the DPRK (which itself has kept very quiet on the incident), the investigation appears to be undermining these initial assertions of accident.

The idea of an accident on the Cheonan always seemed very suspicious. The vessel was patrolling the disputed Northern Limit Line, the maritime boundary between the two Korean states. North Korea has never accepted the demarcation, so patrols by either side have sporadically clashed in “crab wars.” So it should not be so surprising that investigators now believe an external explosion caused the ship to sink.

How and why would the DPRK sink the Cheonan? One common explanation is that the ship struck a sea mine. But, as naval analysts have pointed out, it has been decades since mines have been detected, which means that this was either a truly awful unforeseeable event, or that the DPRK has very quietly and very recently laid a substantial number of sea mines.

Consequently some Korean officials believe a torpedo sunk the Cheonan, though they have admitted that DPRK subs were not detected close to Baengnyeong Island and would have been slow to reach it or escape. Another variation on this theme is the idea of a human torpedo attack, recalling the tactics of WWII era frogmen, though this is the most unlikely scenario. A torpedo attack would be especially provocative, because it would show deliberate intent on the DPRK’s part to sink the Cheonan.

The careful handling of the situation so far has prevented the Cheonan from becoming the Maine of a second Korean war. But the drama surrounding the ship is certainly not over yet.

A Tea Party Resurgence?

It seems poor old Charlie Crist just can’t catch a break these days. The popular Governor, once considered a shoe-in for Mel Martinez’s vacant Senate seat in Florida (holding a 14-point lead in the November Rasmussen poll over his challenger Marco Rubio), he now seems to be facing near certain defeat at the polls, trailing his more ardently right of center opponent by a 30-point spread in the latest round of polls, unable to effectively quell conservative anger over his moderate tendencies (a rather friendly February 2009 photo-op with President Obama and Crist’s strong support for the stimulus package hasn’t helped him with the base voters either.

In Kentucky, another interesting race pits the Tea Party faithful against an established Republican. Political novice Rand Paul, son of fiscal conservative messiah Congressman Ron Paul (R-TX), is up against the more moderate Secretary of State Trey Grayson (endorsed by, strangely enough, Former Vice President Dick Cheney). A deep distrust of elected officials – in Washington and otherwise, has seriously damaged Grayson’s prospects for victory, and he now trails his celebrity opponent by an average of 10-points in the most recent polls.

The most interesting social phenomenon in American politics since the inauguration of President Obama nearly a year and a half ago has been the fomentation of the grassroots, conservative Tea Party movement. If Rubio (as well as Paul) is to prevail in this primary (as all signs – barring scandal – currently seem to indicate that he will), it will be the most significant political victory of the movement to date (barring an exceedingly unlikely repeal of the Democrat’s healthcare bill, which has little traction in either house of congress).

Regardless, the same persisting questions to the endurance of this movement remain. Its power will continue to diminish as laid-off Americans (the Tea Party’s most resilient and boisterous supporters) slowly (but surely) begin to re-enter the workforce and the economy shakes off the tremors of recession. A lack of ideological centralization and completeness in the movement may also continue to ebb at its prospects for success (as demonstrated by this year’s Tea Party Convention and the glaring omission of Foreign Policy issues from their campaign rhetoric).

The friction between conservative Tea Partiers and more moderate establishment Republicans will define the party’s election prospects in November. The momentum in opinion polls remains with the right (although President Obama seems to have seriously hit a policy-making stride post-Healthcare on both domestic and international issues), but could run itself into a ditch if these primary fights become too taxing, and although Rubio’s commanding lead likely won’t diminish too much in the coming months, Crist’s campaign will likely have to take a decidedly negative bent if he wants to salvage his prospects in this race (and consequently, his political career).

The majority of the questions asked here will not be answered for some time. We cannot tell whether this movement will have staying power, but its influence will have a dramatic political impact on the midterm elections.

Florida Senate Candidates Charlie Crist and Marco Rubio enjoy a more cordial moment. Source: World News.

             After negotiating for the better part of a year, American and Russian powers that be have finally found their way to agreement on a new arms control treaty to replace the START protocol that expired in December of last year. The new pact is to be signed in Prague a year to the day after President Obama’s “world without nuclear weapons” speech in Hradcany square, and it represents what the Times’ Peter Baker calls his “most concrete” foreign policy achievement thus far. Hold on there, Pete. As per Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, the Senate has the ultimate power to ratify treaties the President makes by a two-thirds vote. If at least 67 senators do not vote in favor, all the administration’s efforts will have been for naught.
              Recent history would seem to suggest that Obama is on safe ground here. The 2002 SORT “Treaty of Moscow” reduction pact put forth by George W. Bush passed the Senate unanimously, while his father’s original START treaty of 1991 saw a mere 6 votes in opposition. Yet conditions on the ground in Washington are even less conducive to sweeping bipartisan agreements then they normally are, so soon after the shouting matches, hissy fits and procedural slights that surrounded the passage of health reform.  Republicans have a bitter taste in their mouths, and whatever willingness for cooperation they may or may not have had from the outset is certainly dead by now. The prospect of handing Democrats a foreign affairs credit to go with healthcare  on their campaign resume for November can’t be appealing to the GOP , though saying every Senator in the opposition would completely trade national interests for political ones  is a bit premature. The White House has been quick to emphasize that nothing in the new treaty  places constraints on missile defense programs championed by conservatives (though the Russians could presumably withdraw if they thought some rapid antimissile build-up ”violated the spirit” of the agreement).  Richard Lugar, ranking Republican on the Foreign Affairs Committee,  has voiced his support for ratification along with Senators John McCain and Lindsay Graham of the Armed Services Committee  (other key players have yet to declare a position,  including Kit Bond of the Intelligence Committee and minority leader Mitch McConnell).  Assuming the treaty does pass, it will likely have prompted pledges from Obama to boost support for other Pentagon projects to ensure votes from across the aisle.

Peter Beinart says Barack Obama earned a hard-fought victory against Bibi:

Howard Berman, the influential Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, declared that “the administration had real justification for being upset.” California’s Dianne Feinstein announced that “the chronic expansion of settlements is a serious obstacle.” Even the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (we Jews have so many “major” organizations that the organizations themselves need an organization)—not a group known for its even-handedness when it comes to Israel and its neighbors—called on “all parties” to “act in a manner that does not undercut” peace talks. …

Netanyahu will find it harder to torpedo upcoming talks with the Palestinians or to ensure that nothing of substance gets discussed. More importantly, Obama has shown that he can take on Netanyahu and inflict more political damage than he incurs.

This is like the arguing about “victory” in the War in Iraq. There’s only “victory” if you accomplish a set goal. If Obama’s goal was to bully Netanyahu a little, then he’s scored a partial success. I say partial because some of Obama’s lofty demands are impossible to enforce. Even Shimon Peres, the highly respected elder statesman of Israel, reaffirmed the Israeli right to build in Jerusalem. And 78 of Israel’s 120 Members of Knesset — basically everyone to the right of Meretz — signed letters saying that Netanyahu should defend Israeli building in Jerusalem.

In the short term, we probably will see fewer announcements of East Jerusalem construction. We will also see Bibi try hard to get the proximity talks back on track, making some concessions along the way.

But Obama’s long-range goal has been to get a negotiated two-state solution in his first term, and nothing he’s done in his term so far — including this mess — that makes that outcome any closer. The real test between the countries is not going to be over relatively minor issues like the Ramat Shlomo neighborhood; the true battle of wills will come deep into the negotiating process, when existential questions are tackled.

Even Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton — men who shared a personal bond and had a great deal of respect for each other — went through a torturous time trying to negotiate at the Camp David Accords in 2000. Shlomo Ben-Ami, then Israel’s foreign minister and the head of the Israeli negotiating team, said this as the conference neared an inconclusive end: “It was very difficult for Ehud. Very difficult. After we decided to stay on despite everything, and after Clinton left, Barak went into two days of isolation in his cabin. None of us saw him for two days. He was in deep depression.”

I was relieved to see Netanyahu and Hillary Clinton reach an understanding that fell short of her initial lofty demands over the weekend. But I don’t see why this couldn’t have been done simply by persuading Bibi to take these steps in concert with other confidence-building measures by all the regional players. Instead, David Axelrod spoke on TV this Sunday as though he thought Netanyahu intentionally created this crisis.

All of this is to say that there’s going to need to be a good deal of trust and positive reinforcement when the truly substantive issues get discussed. The fact that the administration realizes they overreached with their demands and were willing to work around them means they have finally placed a little pragmatism into their strategy. Former American peace negotiator puts it thusly: “Unless they want …regime change instead of behavior modification, this could be the smartest thing (the live to fight another day strategy) that they’ve done on this issue.”

Bad Timing

As I’ve written previously, Turkey has taken steps to craft a more assertive, independent foreign policy – a strategy that has served well to accommodate Turkey’s national and popular interests. One part of this strategy has been avoiding a confrontational policy towards Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Indeed, it has often played the role of mediator, and the IAEA would have used Turkey as a transit point in a uranium enrichment deal with Iran. In 2006, when Turkey was closer to the US-European line, Iran cut off Turkish natural gas. Turkey has significant investments in Iranian petroleum and other industrial infrastructure, and important security ties to Iran against threats from Kurdistan and border drug trafficking.

At the same time, there is still room for Turkish cooperation on the Iranian nuclear issue. Turkey and Iran are not necessarily enemies, but they are by no means allies. There are real fears in Turkey about an Iranian nuclear bomb and Iranian hegemony, and the US should be able to tap into them to elicit a larger Turkish role in the Iranian nuclear issue. So what’s the rational diplomatic thing to do? Launch another horribly timed Foreign Affairs Committee resolution on the Armenian genocide, an issue on which Turkey and Armenia were making significant progress.

Turkey needs to examine the historical wrongs it inflicted. But Americans should know better than to think that issuing these sort of statements will neither encourage Turkey to ignore its national interests nor foster cooperation on our own. One might have thought the US government would have figured this out after Nancy Pelosi attempted to bring the resolution to vote in 2007, infuriating Turkey and coinciding with their anti-PKK incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan. Now, Turkey is threatening to deport 100,000 Armenians and perhaps even revoke US use of Incilrik air force base.

Ethics and truth do have a place in foreign affairs, especially those of a democratic country. But given the range of issues this resolution has undermined Turkish cooperation in, including the livelihoods of real, living Armenians, I can’t help but think the Foreign Affairs Committee has confused defiance for wisdom.

Gordon Brown’s Labour Party, whose chances to win back parliament this spring have been all but written off by British pundits time and again, is finally showing new signs of life in the polls, narrowing the lead of rival David Cameron’s Conservative Party to well under ten points in recent polls (his lead trimmed to as narrow as two points in some polls) as U.K. economic indicators seem to be consistently trending in the right direction for the first time since the onset of global recession which left their domestic economy in tatters. Brown’s ineffectiveness in combating the fiscal downturn was supposed to be his death knell. But for all of his prowess in Question Time debates, Cameron has shown a marked inability to communicate his message effectively to the middle and working class voters, Tony Blair’s and “New Labour’s” key crutch in their 1997 victory over John Major and the Conservatives, who remain wary of drastic government spending but also fear that essential social programs may be at risk. Cameron’s centrist principles have angered some and he is even distrusted among much of the senior conservative elite, unable to shirk himself of the “Notting Hill set,” his young group of advisers and friends who influence much of his political decision-making. In order to be truly effective and reverse his sinking poll numbers, Cameron must find a way to bring party elders into the fold.

If these numbers hold, the possibility of a hung parliament looms, leaving Labour (or perhaps even the Conservatives) with the most seats in Parliament but without a majority of seats, requiring Brown to form a haphazard alliance with Nick Clegg’s more leftist Liberal Democrats, or Cameron to unite with Labour and the LDP (similar to Angela Merkel’s awkward “Grand Coalition” with her primary SPD rivals in Germany’s last government) to pass any major legislation. Ultimately this is a politically insolvent situation for Britain’s majoritarian system, which is designed to allow the ruling party to dominate government, not bolster political coalition-making and bipartisanship. If the May 6th election yields this result, Brown will necessarily have to compromise much of his agenda to suit the LDP, which is not politically important in the grand scheme of things and will not bolster the party’s future ambitions (consistently polling between ten and twenty points below both Labour and the Conservatives.)

British politics is always a rousing game and there are no signs that there will be any change to that pattern this year. Gordon Brown has climbed off the ropes in a campaign that most pundits and analysts considered to be unwinnable for Labour. The result now hangs in the balance.

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