It’s pretty undeniable now that President Obama screwed up. Badly. He and his administration were so eager to re-start Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that they got ahead of themselves. U.S. policymakers had the right idea by trying to get the two sides to offer confidence-building measures before the talks began. But they handled this poorly, on a number of fronts.

First, they set the respective demands of the parties without consulting them to ascertain what they were capable of delivering at that point. As a result, American officials were sharply disappointed when Saudi Arabia announced they weren’t going along with Obama’s intiative. Then, even after the Arabs failed to produce any signs of goodwill, the administration continued to press Israel for a complete stop to settlement construction — even growth in existing settlements, and even in Jerusalem’s municipal borders. This had the effect of artificially raising expectations on the Palestinian side. Why artificially? Because, once again, the American demand was made without any sense of what could actually be accomplished.

Artificially raising expectations is extremely dangerous in the Middle East. Take an example from today, as Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced he won’t run for re-election:

It was nonetheless clear that Israeli-Palestinian talks would not resume any time soon despite intensive American diplomacy. A top aide to Mr. Abbas said a large part of the “despondency and frustration” felt by Mr. Abbas and the entire Palestinian leadership was due to President Obama’s unrealized promises to the region. He said he feared that without a stop to settlements, Islamist rivals in Hamas could triumph and violence could break out.

“There was high expectation when he arrived on the scene,” the aide, Nabil Shaath, who heads the Fatah party’s foreign affairs department, said of Mr. Obama at a briefing. “He said he would work to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that it would play a major role in improving the American and Western relationship with the Muslim world. Now there is a total retreat, which has destroyed trust instead of building trust.”

The Wall Comes Down-November 1989

Twenty years ago, as the Berlin Wall was coming down and Eastern Europe was freeing itself of Soviet hegemony, an obscure academic named Francis Fukayama published an essay that would epitomize the spirit of the times:

“What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of Foreign Affairs’ yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run.”

After its publication (the essay was later expanded into a book in 1992), “End of History” became one of those few bits of polisci discourse to break out of the ivory tower and go mainstream, alternately praised and rejected as observers seek ordering principles for era that seems to relish in chaos and unpredictability. A generation later, are we still at the end of history?

Yes — it’s just taking longer than was thought in 1989. Key to understanding why are three fundamental assumptions in the essay: that the end of history is meant to be an eventual rather than immediate reality, that for all practical purposes this “end” (the spread and triumph of democracy) is determined by the character of the great powers rather than impotent “outpost” states, and that the “vanguard” of democracy is often economic rather than political liberalization.

Thus, critics’ assertion that Islamic fundamentalism represents a viable alternative to liberal democracy on the order of fascism and communism in the twentieth century is wrong, because the ideology is inherently limited in its spread to areas with Muslim-majority populations where the religion is deeply ingrained in history and culture (even then, extremist interpretation is almost always in the minority). Moreover, there are no Islamic fundamentalist great powers. The Iranian theocracy is a miserable failure and the Taliban ride horses; the most economically successful and influential “fundamentalist” state is by far Saudi Arabia, still hopelessly far from great powerdom.

The second claim against the end of history is the more serious “China model” of economic opening without political liberalization, free markets without the free society set in motion by reforms from the late 70s to the present. China is now the world’s second-largest economy and continues to grow as global capitalism, industry and modernization meet a population of 1.3 billion, and its burgeoning GDP allows the government to pour billions back into education, infrastructure, technological research and development, and the military. The “Communist” Party pays lip service to its Marxist heritage while welcoming wealthy business owners and entrepreneurs; its legitimacy is based on the ability to ensure continued growth and strategic appeals to Chinese nationalism (as with the Taiwan issue). Dissent from the party line is illegal, censorship of politically “dangerous” material widespread, and protest (of which there are thousands per year, mostly in rural areas) is crushed.

Does this authoritarian capitalist paradigm constitute a broad challenge to liberal democracy? If the CCP can maintain it deep into the twenty first century, then maybe, but that would require the Chinese on the whole to be somehow resistant to the prolonged effects of globalized capitalism and economic development that in a mere twenty years have already transformed their country, and that transformation is far from complete. Twenty years from now, the number of people in the country’s middle class (by Chinese income standards) will exceed the total population of the EU today. The likelihood that the Party can incorporate so many of these people—the new bourgeoisie—into the existing power structure and maintain stability without opening itself to some public debate and tolerance of basic rights characteristic of an emerging democratic order appears slim to none. The capitalist autocracy of the present is not a finalized “alternative” but an intermediary stage of transition for a very big country.

The Washington Post’s website is running not one, but two stories today about Arab anger over a shift in the Obama administration’s Middle East policy; the U.S. is no longer demanding a complete stop to Israeli settlement construction before Israeli-Palestinian peace talks begin. This is an effect of Obama tying his hands in the first place with his strategy for resolving the conflict. (My upcoming print article will focus on remedying this problem.)

Obama and his foreign policy team rushed into peacemaking mode from the get-go. Unfortunately, they didn’t lay enough groundwork early on. They didn’t consult any of the planned participants to see what they could offer as goodwill gestures. For instance, the president hoped that he could gain Israeli trust by getting Arab states to open flight paths to Israeli airliners. In exchange, he would demand a total stop to settlement construction.

The Arab states politely told the administration to go to hell. And yet the Palestinians, now having the president of the United States on their side, insisted on a total settlement halt as a precondition to negotiations — an unprecedented step. Netanyahu’s efforts to ease Palestinian freedom of movement and an actual temporary freeze in new construction were dismissed as “not good enough” for the Palestinians to even begin talking to Israel. Meanwhile, the Palestinian and Arab contribution the peace process in 2009 has been nil. Is this even-handed foreign policy?

So, yes, the U.S. is recalibrating its Middle East policy. Perhaps rather than a reverse-Bush approach of wishful thinking from the side of “pressure Israel on settlements at all costs,” a realistic view of the situation on the ground is called for.

Photo courtesy of the BBC

Given the most recent example of drug murders in Mexico, increasingly Cormac McCarthy’s seminal novel detailing violence along the US-Mexico border in 1980 seems to be coming to life. Though President Felipe Calderón instituted a major offensive against cartels upon his 2006 election, thus far the results have been more than decidedly mixed.

Last week recent raids in 19 states on the part of the US government captured more than 300 individuals suspected of ties with La Familia, one of Mexico’s most violent cartels. This major two-day operation is part of the much larger Project Coronado, which in its 4 year existence has resulted in the arrests of 1,186 individuals and the seizure of $33 million in drug cash, nearly 2,000 kilograms of cocaine, 2,730 pounds of methamphetamine, 29 pounds of heroin, 16,390 pounds of marijuana, and 389 weapons.

Though these events certainly suggest a positive trend, the reality remains that they represent a tiny dent in Mexico’s flourishing drug trade, as overall levels of violence in the country have increased since last year. Ciudad Juarez experienced more than 1,300 deaths in the first eight months of this year alone, despite an incredibly heavy police presence. Further hindering the process are allegations of corruption among local police. In Tijuana, for example, police lost the ability to carry arms for three weeks while the government investigated corruption charges, brought in Federal Police, and relegated local law enforcement to using slingshots.

Though the Calderón government certainly appears to be making a concreted effort, despite the impressive seizure records, drug cartels within Mexico show no appreciable signs of slowing down. In my opinion, the Mexican government is doing just about all they can to fight this war and I do not see major advances being made unless the United States dramatically steps up its involvement, a proposition I only see happening once innocent Americans caught up in the conflict start dying on American soil in large numbers.

Remember the Biden-Gelb measure of 2007? Didn’t think so.

It ambitiously proposed partitioning Iraq into four separate nations along sectarian, ethnic and regional lines. With the situation in Iraq rapidly deteriorating, the measure passed with 75 votes in the Senate, but was doomed by Iraqi officials who argued it entailed a long term U.S. presence and showed distrust in Iraqi security forces.

But this plan may actually be the blueprint for success in Afghanistan, a baby “democracy” largely divided by tribal dissidence and conflict. Though Hamid Karzai labels himself “big-tent” president and claims allies from across the spectrum, he caters heavily to his own people, the Pashtuns, to ensure political survival, often leaving  Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Turkmen minorities out in the cold.

Structural and historical realities of the state resist centralized, democratic rule and most rely on local governments, tribal councils, coalition troops and warlord rule to ensure security. A modified Biden-Gelb plan would face facts and establish a strong federal structure, diffusing power and checking local leaders to make them more accountable.

Institutions are the currency of the modern nation-state, and Afghanistan must be built upon this unmistakable truth. By reinvesting U.S. ground presence in military advisers and coordinating our efforts with local leaders, we can develop an institutional framework on military, social and political levels that can eventually constitute a strong, federalized bureaucracy.

But the White House must first determine if this war is worth fighting.

President Obama faces a double-edged sword. If the President decides to withdraw troops and Afghanistan falls, their fragile and nuclear-armed neighbor Pakistan will face grave danger. If the President calls for full implementation of General McChrystal’s recommendations, his popularity may take a substantial hit.

This war is central to our national security, and the cost of inaction could be tragic. The Biden-Gelb plan could bring stability to Afghanistan, but it is laden with sacrifices that Obama may be unwilling to make.

Shadow Prime Minister David Cameron once claimed that Gordon Brown often seems too preoccupied with saving the world than to occupy himself with the concerns of the British people. Whether this charge is true or not, the Tories have managed to maintain a 13% lead in the polls over the Labour Party, despite recent policies promising income-tax increases, reduction of public-sector payments and tax credits.

In 2011 the British debt is expected to reach a £1 trillion height and Labour seems to be doing little to combat the looming burden of payments.  Gordon Brown has proposed to sell public assets in an abnormally depressed market and thereby raise £3 billion for debt repayments. The plan should cumulatively raise approximately £16 billion, but some £13 billion will be reinvested in other public projects. The ambivalent nature of Labour’s debt management plan have only contributed to low approval ratings and sinking re-election chances.

A majority of Britons agree: budget cuts are unavoidable. Preparing for the elections that must be called by early summer, the Tory party has already begun, in general terms, to outline their planned policies. David Cameron and George Osborne, Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, have catered to a public desire for “straight” talk, a euphemism for realism. The Tories propose that government debt will necessitate higher taxes, but more importantly freezes on public-sector pay, reductions of tax credits and the promotion of “small” government.

Despite the logic of these proposals, the entire question of government has been set by the wrong paradigm. It is not a question of large government versus small government, but of efficiency versus incompetence. The solution to the financial crisis is not necessarily the reduction of government. Remember the Keynesians who urged for large bouts of government spending and the necessity of stimulus. The bailout successes [or lack thereof have more to do with the good sense of the politicians who implemented them than the mere policy itself. Furthermore, consider the more tightly regulated banks of Spain and Canada that did not face the same severity of the credit crunch as in the United Kingdom or United States. An efficient government, which may imply regulation, can guarantee the health and even competitiveness of a market that cannot regulate itself.

The responsibilities of government vary from issue to issue, including and alternatively precluding government intervention and regulation. The duty of government is the protection of the public from exploitation, of the economy from monopoly and other unhealthy manifestations of an unregulated market. The task of government is also the recognition of its own limitations and the reasonable restraint of services which it cannot afford. To suggest that surmounting the impending debt dilemma is only a matter of decreasing the size of the government is nothing more than an oversimplification of the crisis facing the United Kingdom as well as many other countries around the globe.

It is not the size of government that determines political and economic success; it is efficiency.

During the past summer, the voters of Thüringen, Germany, elected a new government – or at least they thought they had. The election results revealed a new trend in politics when, after years of majority rule over the state legislature, the Christian Democrats (CDU) gained less than 50% of the vote. Although still the largest party proportionally elected to the government, the center-right CDU acquired only 30 out of 88 seats in parliament. Due to the lack of an absolute majority, it seemed as though the CDU would be ousted from government.

Die Linke, a far-left party reminiscent of the former Social Unity Party of East Germany, won a startling 27 seats and posed a real contender for a governing coalition. Although typically considered a pariah political party, Die Linke have been known to form coalition governments with the Social Democrats (SPD: 18 seats) on occasion. If both parties could have shaken hands at the negotiating table, then a majority of 45 seats could have been attained, the magic number that the CDU previously held. Should the coalition have felt weak, they could have invited the Green party and their additional 6 seats to form a strong majority coalition.

There were, however, some catches. The SPD state-boss, Christoph Matschie, demanded that Die Linke concede the position of Minister President to an SPD official. As the clear and distinct majority partner in the coalition, it is rather obvious why Die Linke were unwilling to make this concession. Nevertheless, Matschie showed consistent hesitation towards a coalition with a party, which he deems ‘untrustworthy,’ despite urges from within his own party to cooperate.

A sincere opposition within the SPD arose as a result of two considerations: 1. If a government is not formed with Die Linke, then it must be formed with the CDU. No other likely coalitions could reach a majority. 2. If the SPD formed a coalition with the CDU, then there would be no legitimate alteration in the style of government. Given their platform to bring change to Thüringen from the previous CDU dominance, the SPD would consequently betray their constituency if they ruled with the Christian Democrats. Despite these reservations, this past Sunday Matschie was able to convince his party to approve with a 75% majority the assumption of a formal coalition government with the CDU. Considering the astonishingly low representation of the SPD in the national Bundestag (23%) and elsewhere in Germany (often attributed to their former Grand Coalition politics with the CDU), now is certainly not the time for the SPD to squander their seemingly limited political capital. The Thüringen coalition may serve short-term goals for the Social Democrats, but the decision to abandon campaign promises may just inflict further, most likely long-term damage to voter confidence.

A majority of voters in Thüringen voted to elect a new government. What they have now received is practically what they had before.

J Street — the new “pro-peace, pro-Israel” advocacy group touted as an alternative to AIPAC — is currently hosting its first conference. The run-up to the conference included much fanfare, some good and some bad. One Palestinian poet who was invited to speak at the conference was asked not to participate after it was learned he compared Guantanamo to Auschwitz. Charming.

I’ve always thought I resisted J Street’s mission, until I came to a big realization: They don’t know what their mission is. Take this Jeffrey Goldberg interview with J Street executive director Jeremy Ben-Ami. In it we learn that Ben-Ami:

• Is a Zionist. He believes in a Jewish state of Israel.
• Believes that the Mearsheimer and Walt screed The Israel Lobby is dishonest and possibly anti-Semitic.
• Says U.S. military aid to Israel is vital to American security interests.

   

  

  Ben-Ami. Courtesy of Haaretz

• Also says that this aid should not be tied to Israel’s settlement policy.
• Credits AIPAC and other pro-Israel elements with important political victories for the pro-Israel community.
• Supports Israel’s Law of Return, by which any Jew can immigrate to Israel and earn instant citizenship.
• Doesn’t think the U.S. government or the American Jewish community should push Israel to talk to Hamas against the wishes of the Israeli government.
• Denounces the “one-state solution” as both a moral and practical non-starter.

Ben-Ami also stated in another interview that “AIPAC nominally supports the notion of a two-state solution, but . . . advocating for aggressive American leadership to achieve it is not high on its priority list. For us at J Street, it’s the centerpiece of our agenda.” In other words, the difference is not in views but in priorities and strategy. Fine.

The problem is that other times J Street sounds like it attempts to be an alternative, rather than a supplement, to AIPAC. Take these comments from co-founder Alan Solomont: “We have heard the voices of neocons, and right-of-center Jewish leaders and Christian evangelicals, and the mainstream views of the American Jewish community have not been heard.”

So does J Street offer the same policy positions as AIPAC, or different ones? I think many Jewish Americans — myself included — would love an advocacy group that pushed for sensible steps toward peace — but not at the expense of successful, non-partisan groups like AIPAC. J Street needs to decide what it really wants to be: a fringe group or a complement to existing groups.

P.S. Interesting that Stephen Walt endorsed J Street. Part of his expansive and nefarious “Israel lobby” includes such J Street partners as the Israel Policy Forum.

Prime Minister Erdogan, courtesy RFE/RL

A few weeks ago, the Turkish government canceled the joint military exercise  Anatolia Eagle because Turkey would not invite Israel, while the US refused to participate in an exercise that traditionally included the Israelis. While a departure from the norm, the  diplomatic fracas between Turkey, Israel and the US is just the latest development in the steady deterioration of the US and Israeli relations with Turkey since the successive 2002 and 2007 victories of the AK (Justice and Development) Party in general elections.

Turkey, with its heritage in Ataturk’s secular-nationalist vision and close ties to Western powers and ideas, has been an outlier in the Middle East. It was the second Muslim country (after Iran) to recognize Israel, and remains a NATO member. Turkey cooperated with Israel in military modernization and training, and they shared common interest in opposing Iran and Syria during the 1990s. Since 2002, though, the moderate Islamist AKP has presided over a shift in Turkish foreign policy, one heavy-handed Western actions in Turkey’s near abroad exacerbated. Turkey refused to include its forces in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and its 2007-2008 intervention against the PKK put the US on edge.

Israeli tensions with Hamas and especially Operation Cast Lead in Gaza severely strained Turkish relations. Turkish PM Erdogan’s spat with Peres at Davos reflected of a public mood in Turkey that earlier turned against the West and Israel. The Turkish people poll strongly against America and Mein Kampf was a 2005 best-seller. A Slate piece looks into the popularity of anti-Americanism in Turkey, showcasing a blockbuster Turkish film vehemently criticizing the American invasion of Iraq and featuring Gary Busey as an organ-stealing Jewish doctor; a best-selling 2004 novel ends with Turkey hitting DC with a nuclear bomb.

Turkish national and elite interests moderate popular sentiment to some extent – but this all should trouble the US. Firstly, Turkey has always held strategic importance as a geopolitical and cultural bridge between Europe and Asia. It is a NATO member and maintains strong ties to Europe, and whether one is dealing with Russian energy politics, containing Iranian influence, or maintaining leverage in the Middle East, Turkey is an important partner. But Turkey is also held as a model of Muslim democracy – and this same democracy elected a party which will voice the preferences of its people. Democracy and American strategic interests in the Middle East will only coexist when America, and its ally Israel, pursue ends amenable to the populations who elect those democratic governments to begin with.

Most of us know Maine as the source of Poland Spring water and the vacation destination of well-to-do New Englanders. Once a spot-on bellwether of national trends, it is today regarded as one of the country’s most prominent liberal enclaves. So with Maine no longer a political game changer, what’s with all this fuss over Proposition 1?

Maine Gov. John Baldacci becomes the first governor to sign a bill legalizing same-sex marriage, May 6, 2009

The Pine Tree State made history last May when Gov. John Baldacci signed a bill authorizing same-sex marriage, becoming the first state to legalize same-sex marriage through legislative process rather than judicial ruling. Immediately, the outcome was hailed by LGBT rights advocates as a victory for equality. Baldacci agreed in his signing statement:

I did not come to this decision lightly or in haste. I have come to believe that this is a question of fairness and of equal protection under the law, and that a civil union is not equal to civil marriage.

Proponents of traditional marriage, emboldened by their previous success in blue California, quickly mounted enough signatures to place the question on next week’s ballot as Proposition 1. Maine’s voters will have to decide whether to accept same-sex marriage by voting NO or reject it by voting YES.

Regardless of outcome, the ramifications of this decision could be seismic. If Maine rejects Prop 1 and stands with their elected representatives and Governor, the vote could mark a turning point for LGBT activists. After all, same-sex marriage has yet to win passage in any state by popular vote.

On the other hand, if Maine passes Prop 1 and overturns their legislature, they risk following California in two ways- firstly by denying equality and secondly by establishing the problematic precedent of popular votes overturning controversial but well-reasoned legislative decisions.