1. The “stewardship” of the United Nations for actually preventing any conflict, anywhere in the world at any time in its 65 year history has been less than stellar; the UN usually does a decent job as a sort of multinational clean-up crew for after the wars have run their course (ceasefires, tents, aid packages, border monitors etc..). Now, it would be spectacular if preventative strikes against Iran were launched by a real multinational coalition (like this), but everyone knows that’s about as likely as, say, a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
2. Well, if the revolutionary guards are in control of Iran now anyway, what’s the difference?
3. So basically, Iranian proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah become untouchable, because Iran will resort to nuclear weapons every time Israeli planes strike rocket launchers in the Gaza strip or southern Lebanon. Because, you know, every time an American plane pounded the Vietcong, the Soviets and the Chinese hit us back with a nuclear weapon.
4. Certainly a nuclear-armed Iran might be inclined to act more aggressively toward America’s Arab allies in and around the Persian Gulf. In that case, the United States should increase its own military presence in the gulf (like we’re already doing) and help the gulf states bolster their own defenses (like we’re already doing) to shore up the entire region.
5. There will never be a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, but that’s what makes the rejectionists on both sides rejectionists. The whole process is rife with rejectionism already. That’s like saying if you shoot off a dead camel’s leg, then the poor thing won’t be able to walk.
6. Iran and North Korea having nuclear weapons is certainly a setback for proliferation, but not a fatal one; there are still fortysome countries that could go nuclear with relative ease, but choose not to because they simply see no benefit (security or otherwise) to doing so.

                The Liberal Democrats are far and away the most Eurocentric, and (after more than half the chapter devoted to climate change and developing world aid) talk about placing Britain “at the heart of Europe”  to the point of eventually adopting the Euro. This would replace the “subservient and dangerous” relationship with the United States that drags Britain into things like the “illegal” invasion of Iraq. Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent of Trident submarines should also be abandoned. The contrast with the Conservatives could not be greater, who spend a large portion of their IR section on support for and reform in the military, then enumerate foreign policy points indicative of a vision for the UK as and independent global power. Here is found a list describing factors behind that power, like being “a global trading nation,” having “a leading role in NATO,” being “home to the world’s pre-eminent language” and commanding “armed forces that are the envy of the world.” Britain under a Tory government would pursue a “new special relationship with India,” engage China while “standing firm for human rights,” and push to widen UN Security Council membership, among other “hard-headed and practical” ideas”. It seems these people would love to run America, if “a strong, close and frank relationship with the United States” were not mentioned. The most animated part of the Tory chapter concerns the idea of a European Union that should be “an association of its member states” rather than “a federal Europe” of which Britain should not be a part. The Labor government’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty without a referendum was “a betrayal democratic traditions” and no more powers—let alone the British pound—should be transferred to Brussels. On the contrary, “the steady and unaccountable intrusion of the EU into every aspect of our lives has gone to far” and certain EU powers on criminal justice and social legislation should return to London.

                Compared to its challengers, Labour’s approach is more nuanced and less decisive either way. The ruling party derides the Tories’ Euroskepticism as “sullen resistance and disengagement that achieve nothing” and talks about positioning the UK to “lead” a Europe that “engages bilaterally” with the world’s other major powers and enhances its economic competitiveness with continued enlargement and certain internal reforms (infrastructure, financial regulation agriculture). No mention of America or the “special relationship” is made outside a passage criticizing the “poverty of the Tory vision” which presents a “false choice between an alliance with the United States and one with Europe.” Such an outlook would make a Prime Minister Cameron “isolated in the EU” to an extent that damagingly “undermines British influence.” Certainly no mention of Iraq exists at all—in contrast to a lengthy discourse on the importance of the Afghan mission and how the current government plans on ensuring success there, along with military funding pledges that include maintenance of the nuclear deterrent. The remaining space is devoted to passages hailing Labour’s commitments to foreign development, and reforming global institutions like the UN and the World Bank.

In the current edition, I found an essay by Brue Gilley titled “Not So Dire Straits” to be particularly interesting, given how tensions between China and the United States have grown sharper in recent months. Gilley’s topic is Taiwan, and his big idea is how the twenty-first century geopolitical landscape of the Pacific will effectively “Finlandize” the Taiwanese—that is, make the island’s position vis-à-vis Washington and Beijing similar to Finland’s Cold War limbo between NATO and the Soviet Union. In that case, the Finnish government stuck what became a grand bargain with both superpowers that allowed it to preserve its democratic autonomy from historic domination by Russia, alleviate Russian concerns (by muting outright hostility to the Soviet regime), stay on friendly (but not formally allied) terms with America, and become an essential mediator between the rival blocs as a result. As a small country jammed up against the Soviet behemoth, this was the best strategy Finland could hope to pursue, and a situation born of necessity ultimately become one of benefit for the United States.

As the Taiwanese come to terms with their living arrangements next to a China that grows more powerful by the day, Gilley argues that a consensus among policymakers in Taipei will continue to form around such a “Finlandized” approach, following the early steps taken by current President Ma Ying-jeou with the aim of furthering the détente of the moment. Debate in Washington is less nuanced, with too many government actors on both sides of the aisle still clinging to a false zero-sum choice: either redouble the Pentagon’s efforts to beef up what Douglas MacArthur famously called America’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier” or just come to accept “losing China a second time” as a complete, inevitable “sacrifice” to an expanding Chinese sphere of influence. Instead, America should make (as it has already begun to do in many places) military and diplomatic adjustments that serve US interests when the Pacific is less its private lake; but fundamentally America must come to recognize a more Finlandized Taiwan as both a natural development and an opportunity to help diffuse cross-strait tensions, and perhaps even a springboard for political moderation and liberalization on the mainland that would do more for Sino-American peace than any item on the Pentagon’s sales list.

Immanuel Kant wrote Perpetual Peace in 1795, but interestingly enough, his thesis can already be called dead on arrival if one applies this “consensus” idea. Kant’s peace was between “republics” in the Enlightenment sense: that is, representative governments with legislative and executive separations of power, while universal suffrage went unmentioned. I would call Kant’s idea broadly representative of the Enlightenment consensus on democracy, which included the views of America’s founding fathers (who, like Kant, were careful to use the word “republic” to avoid the frightening prospect of mob rule they thought “democracy” with universal suffrage implied). During Kant’s lifetime, which societies most closely resembled this vision? Certainly the United States and Britain, whose political systems featured distinct legislative and executive power centers controlled by “voters” among an educated white male property-owning elite, who spoke the same language and were perhaps a few generations removed from picnicking together in Parliament Square. Yet by 1795, these two societies had already fought a bitter war against each other twenty years before and would fight another twenty years later. Anybody talking about a “democratic peace” back then would have been laughed out of the room.

The original Tea Partiers dressed as Indians and fooled nobody; today's "tea partiers" manage to fool themselves without costumes

If the rebels can take the precinct, the thinking goes, then the state and the national GOP (with its highbrow socialist “enablers”) are sure to follow.

Yet these people are still very much rebels without a cause. The Times article describes a movement that ranges from Ted Kaczynski-esque militiamen to desperate housewives looking for an outlet, but none have anything resembling a policy position. The Teapublican knows, more or less, what he’s against (“big government”, liberals, gays, Obama, Wall Street bailouts, taxes, abortion, the Mexicans, the Chinese, science, “world government”) and thanks to the power of the internet, he knows he’s not alone. But as of yet he doesn’t seem to know much else. Populist range and reactionary anger, feelings of economic anxiety and government betrayal are emotions, not ideas. The greatest irony in all this is that the tea partiers’ polar opposites in the Democratic Party are horrified by the unlettered hordes of right-wingers, but fall for much of the same hysteria themselves (picked up a Rolling Stone lately?). Of course, the bottom line is that zealots don’t win elections because they are by definition outside the mainstream. Tea Party poster child Doug Hoffman couldn’t win last November in a rural district with Leave it to Beaver demographics, and I would bet Michael Moore couldn’t command a majority in San Francisco. But it is the Republicans who have been far more explicit in pandering to their fringe set as part of a loyal “base,” and they seem sure to suffer the consequences.

1. Iran is still just a poor country with unsavory people in control, fantasies of regional hegemony and powerful friends (China and Russia are not even friends, more like business associates who have no stomach for either seriously confronting or seriously supporting Tehran);  so Iran can still be contained by the West and concerned Arab states
2. The mullahs have a warped view of Islam and Persian history, and no qualms about supporting suicide bomber proxies when it appears to enhance their power in the region, but they don’t strap on vests themselves; in other words, the regime may be crazy, but it’s still rational enough not to bring about its own fiery death by atom-bombing its nuclear-armed enemies (there won’t be any nuclear-tipped Shahab missiles sailing toward Tel Aviv or American troops in Afghanistan/Iraq)

However, the remaining 40% is still a big 40% for the following reasons:

1. To salvage what’s left of efforts against nuclear proliferation, America would have to prevent Iran’s nervous Arab neighbors from developing their own nuclear arsenals by guaranteeing these countries military protection. “Entangling alliances” are one thing if they are made with established democracies with whom America has longstanding friendly ties (and whose vital interests clearly overlap with our own), but who really wants to go to war (nuclear war, not first Gulf War) to make the world safe for Saudi Arabia?   
2. Thanks to the White House’s genuine efforts at multilateral diplomacy, military strikes of last resort (however long, bloody and potentially unsuccessful) would at least have more support from America’s allies; the US will have done everything it can to resolve the crises in good faith, right next to the Europeans at the negotiating table to spare us an Iraq-esque loss of political capital with our friends        
3.  The mullahs know a direct nuclear strike by their own military would be suicide, since America and Israel would immediately know where to point and shoot with their own arsenals; but is the regime crazy enough to give nuclear devices to its terrorist proxies? How can America shape a deterrence policy when, if a suitcase bomb goes off in Times Square, we can’t know for certain if Iran sponsored the attack? Do we simply declare that any WMD terrorist attack against America or its allies will be assumed the work of Iran, and then potentially kill millions of innocents for something their rulers may or may not have done?

I certainly would not want to be President Obama, given the agony of the decisions that will have to come from the Oval Office sooner than later.

Obama knows that “ridding the world of nuclear weapons” is about as feasible a policy goal as George Bush’s “ending tyranny in the world.” The idea that a world free of nuclear weapons would be a more peaceful world is itself breathtakingly, dangerously removed from historical reality. Some eighty million people died between 1914 and 1945; that’s what happens in modern industrial warfare between great powers whose interests and ideologies diverge. After 1945 there were still great powers with conflicting interests and ideologies, but nuclear deterrence made “winning” any direct war against each other impossible. The risk that even a small skirmish begun in the morning could end with the belligerents in the Stone Age by mid-afternoon was enough to keep the Cold War cold, and remains the ultimate hedge against WWIII.

That said, America or any other nuclear power needs only enough nukes to maintain a credible deterrent—not more, because warheads are incredibly expensive to maintain, and a security problem when they’re just lying around by the hundreds, tempting terrorists everywhere. The latter point has been acknowledged by Obama on many occasions with his call to stop nuclear proliferation. As long as America has these extra nukes, we may as well put their axing to diplomatic use in reduction talks with Russia and other powers. Moscow is of course not going to completely “disarm” itself any more than we are, but the cost and security issues associated with keeping more bombs than necessary affect it as much as they do Washington. Ultimately, reduction talks (like those Obama is now pursuing) also offer a chance to build trust between governments whose cooperation on a range of other international matters remains vital.

Some have suggested that Obama’s no-nukes stance plays a practical role as part of his greater effort to rebrand America in the eyes of the world, making the US seem less like a hypocritical warmonger when it calls for states like Iran and North Korea to give up their atomic aspirations. But it’s unlikely that these rogues take the President at his word anyway. They know that Obama could theoretically order every silo, sub and bomber under his command to stand down tomorrow if he was so genuinely committed to complete disarmament. And they know that such a ludicrous order would never be heeded; that Congress, the Pentagon and the cabinet would end his presidency before settling for the total collapse of the nuclear umbrella.

So instead of keeping up the disarmament rhetorical charade, it would do the country good for the President to articulate a clearer position on nuclear weapons (his actual position, with realistic goals he’s already acting on) to the public with the same commendable nuance he has other major issues. Unless of course, he seriously believes the world can and should be rid of nukes. In that case we’re in trouble.

That test failed with the collapse of the deal and Iran’s vocal defiance of the recent I.A.E.A resolution to halt construction of the once-secret enrichment facility at Qom, outed by Western intelligence days before America and company sat down with the Islamic Republic for their doomed bargaining summit in Geneva. In Tehran, President Ahmadinejad happily slaps the international community in the face with a declaration of plans (however farfetched) for ten more enrichment plants. In Jerusalem, Prime Minister Netanyahu eyes strike scenarios nervously. In Washington, opposition pundits and politicians can’t help but think their criticisms of a “naïve” White House as vindicated.

Not quite. The first direct US-Iranian engagement in thirty years has failed to win concessions from the Iranians, but diplomacy has still payed off for America, and could yet pay more. The hope was that the regime across the table might genuinely respond to the right incentives from a more conciliatory America if internal political dynamics were favorable. But the reality was always that after its historic overture, those sitting next to America on the same side of the table would be more willing (or more likely) partners if and when it became apparent that real punitive action was inevitable in the form of sanctions and beyond.

This certainly goes for the Europeans whose support is usually taken for granted. Concerted diplomacy having run its course with America in the lead, it will be easier for Brown (or Cameron), Sarkozy, and Merkel to stand behind Obama and in front of their own people at the same time, wherever the standoff ultimately leads. The ball is now in Iran’s court and Iranian intentions made plain, with only the most deluded critics able to argue that bullheaded American saber-rattling is the source of Iranian intransigence. A similar principle applies for the Russians and Chinese, whose degree of commitment to sanctions is still less a failure on the administration’s part than a crucial work in progress (both countries voted with the West to condemn Iran in the I.A.E.A resolution, the first in three years and a rare consensus). If they can be led to conclude by a more nuanced US approach that their business interests must take a backseat to global security, Obama will have achieved a great deal.

Within a year, China’s economy is projected to overtake Japan’s to become the world’s second largest, continuing to grow and develop with all the commercial and technological trappings modernization brings. China already holds the cards with the US on all the issues Gibbs mentioned and engages itself in global politics with a national assertiveness that Japan lacks after two decades of economic stagnation and a looming demographic crisis. Not-so-slowly but surely, it would seem as though East Asia is slipping back into its age old pre-industrial status quo, with the “Middle Kingdom” at the center and its much smaller neighbors on the periphery. This makes the Japanese anxious and more than a little unsure of their place in the world—anxious enough to bring about nothing less than a peaceful revolution with the electoral ouster of the long dominant Liberal Democratic Party, and unsure enough for new PM Hatoyama to opine in the New York Times about balancing between the US-Japan security pact as a “cornerstone of Japanese diplomatic policy” and recognizing East Asia as Japan’s “basic sphere of being” since “the era of US unilateralism may come to an end.”