It’s inescapable to conclude that Barack Obama’s foreign policy on Israel/Palestine has been bound for the foreseeable future by an over-eagerness to jumpstart the issue, before he’d gotten around a learning curve he didn’t expect. Call it naivete, arrogance, simple enthusiasm, or whatever, but his characteristic caution was thrown to the wind. Whereas he took months to decide his strategy for Afghanistan, he’s repeatedly and proudly pointed out that it took him only two days as POTUS to appoint a Special Middle East Envoy. (I’d bet National Security Advisor Jim Jones regrets calling this conflict the “epicenter” of American foreign policy.)

We have a truly strange set of facts on the ground in the Middle East. The most conservative Israeli government in 20 years has, at the request of an American administration, halted for 10 months any new settlement construction in the West Bank and curtailed it in Jerusalem. The West Bank’s economy and governance are improving, led by the moderate Mahmoud Abbas. Yet, the chances of peace are as low as ever.

The Obama Administration has been too eager for achievements to understand the price at which those small achievements come. For example, getting the prized settlement freeze took months of public fighting with Israeli PM Netanyahu, which undermined the trust of the Israeli public and disappointed Arabs by taking so long. Now that the focus is on direct talks and Abbas is being stubborn, Obama’s threatening to play hardball with the PA.

Considering the alternative — admitting temporary defeat — I understand the president’s dogged commitment to the issue. But when would he give up on a banner initiative that probably won’t even get the results he wants? The Middle East is apathetic and discouraged about peace.

And no, none of this is because of the Israel lobby.

The instant analogy is during the Korean War, with Gen. Douglas MacArthur leading the UN force to defend South Korea. MacArthur publicly criticized President Harry Truman’s handling of the war effort throughout 1950 and early 1951. Then in March 1951, MacArthur undercut Truman’s efforts at negotiation with China by issuing his own ultimatum for Chinese surrender. Truman fired MacArthur two weeks later, after receiving a unanimous recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his civilian advisors.

McChrystal has not flouted presidential authority quite the way MacArthur did, but he already came fairly close last September when he wrote to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates of his recommendations on American strategy in Afghanistan — and then released the report to the public. Generals do not make policy; they advise, sure, and they execute the policy, but they do not shape the political atmosphere for the president. That incident alone would have been enough to reassign the General, but the Rolling Stone piece shows a disrespect for the proper order of command that is unfitting of a general and embarrassing to the President.

History has largely vindicated Truman. He said toward the end of his life, “I fired him because he wouldn’t respect the authority of the President. I didn’t fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that’s not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would be in jail.” McChrystal has not respected the authority of the president, and that’s grounds for removal.

Howard Berman, the influential Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, declared that “the administration had real justification for being upset.” California’s Dianne Feinstein announced that “the chronic expansion of settlements is a serious obstacle.” Even the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (we Jews have so many “major” organizations that the organizations themselves need an organization)—not a group known for its even-handedness when it comes to Israel and its neighbors—called on “all parties” to “act in a manner that does not undercut” peace talks. …

Netanyahu will find it harder to torpedo upcoming talks with the Palestinians or to ensure that nothing of substance gets discussed. More importantly, Obama has shown that he can take on Netanyahu and inflict more political damage than he incurs.

This is like the arguing about “victory” in the War in Iraq. There’s only “victory” if you accomplish a set goal. If Obama’s goal was to bully Netanyahu a little, then he’s scored a partial success. I say partial because some of Obama’s lofty demands are impossible to enforce. Even Shimon Peres, the highly respected elder statesman of Israel, reaffirmed the Israeli right to build in Jerusalem. And 78 of Israel’s 120 Members of Knesset — basically everyone to the right of Meretz — signed letters saying that Netanyahu should defend Israeli building in Jerusalem.

In the short term, we probably will see fewer announcements of East Jerusalem construction. We will also see Bibi try hard to get the proximity talks back on track, making some concessions along the way.

But Obama’s long-range goal has been to get a negotiated two-state solution in his first term, and nothing he’s done in his term so far — including this mess — that makes that outcome any closer. The real test between the countries is not going to be over relatively minor issues like the Ramat Shlomo neighborhood; the true battle of wills will come deep into the negotiating process, when existential questions are tackled.

Even Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton — men who shared a personal bond and had a great deal of respect for each other — went through a torturous time trying to negotiate at the Camp David Accords in 2000. Shlomo Ben-Ami, then Israel’s foreign minister and the head of the Israeli negotiating team, said this as the conference neared an inconclusive end: “It was very difficult for Ehud. Very difficult. After we decided to stay on despite everything, and after Clinton left, Barak went into two days of isolation in his cabin. None of us saw him for two days. He was in deep depression.”

I was relieved to see Netanyahu and Hillary Clinton reach an understanding that fell short of her initial lofty demands over the weekend. But I don’t see why this couldn’t have been done simply by persuading Bibi to take these steps in concert with other confidence-building measures by all the regional players. Instead, David Axelrod spoke on TV this Sunday as though he thought Netanyahu intentionally created this crisis.

All of this is to say that there’s going to need to be a good deal of trust and positive reinforcement when the truly substantive issues get discussed. The fact that the administration realizes they overreached with their demands and were willing to work around them means they have finally placed a little pragmatism into their strategy. Former American peace negotiator puts it thusly: “Unless they want …regime change instead of behavior modification, this could be the smartest thing (the live to fight another day strategy) that they’ve done on this issue.”

It would be a mistake for [Obama] to invest in trying to solve the dispute at this stage, however. Paradoxically, outside actors (e.g., the United States) tend to hold more influence over the course of events in the Middle East when Israeli and Arab leaders are stronger. They are more able to take risks towards peacemaking instead of defaulting towards war. Any resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian question (and also the Israeli-Syrian question) necessitates strong leaders who can corral their publics into the risky art of concession. The next Israeli government (following elections in February 2009), whether it is led by Tzipi Livni or Binyamin Netanyahu, will likely not be in a very strong position to negotiate a peace.

The natural corollary is to make weak leaders stronger — such as by tackling Iran, as I tried to explain in my last print article. But Obama decided to follow the reverse approach — to solve Israel-Palestine before fully addressing Iran. This was an approach advocated by his national security advisor Jim Jones, and opposed by his Iran point man on the NSC Dennis Ross.

Only now am I truly able to grasp the horrific magnitude of Obama’s failures in the Middle East. His narrative of linkage has gained traction all the way up to the top brass of the U.S. military. All because the Obama Administration opened up its presidency making promises it could not deliver in the assumption that linkage would work. Surprise, it hasn’t. And it’s only made the Israelis more anxious and less trustful of Washington. And it’s only made the Arabs more anxious and less trustful of Washington.

I am not one to embrace monocausality, but almost every diplomatic problem relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict in Obama’s presidency is tied to his decision to pressure Israel more than the Arabs, and relatedly his decision to tackle the Israeli-Palestinian issue before the Iranian issue. Obama decided to get Israel to deliver a concession no leader could make, especially without any kind of reciprocal measure from the Arabs. He very quickly abandoned his efforts to pressure the Arabs at all, instead doubling down on settlements.

The announcement of Ramat Shlomo is only quite so significant because the Obama Administration has assigned such significance to this kind of building. If the administration had instead made West Bank checkpoints its central crusade, for instance, the Ramat Shlomo development would have been provocative but would not have led to a diplomatic crisis or led to the cancellation of proximity talks.

Meanwhile, Obama has slowplayed Iran. They’re enriching uranium at levels higher than ever before, and it could be a month or more before a vote at the UN Security Council takes place. After this, it’s not even clear there’s a fallback move if it doesn’t work. The administration’s planning has been too forgiving of Iranian intentions, and drastic steps are needed to make up for this lost time. (Drastic steps do not mean airstrikes.) The true menace in the region is not Israel. It is Iran. And if you don’t believe me or Dennis Ross, ask Mahmoud Abbas. And yet Israel and the Arabs are busy fighting over smaller issues when the entire region is about to be upended by an Iranian nuke.

So, to sum up: Obama prioritized Israeli-Palestinian peace over devoting full-time attention to Iran’s nuclear program. In the process, he artificially raised expectations in the region that the U.S. could make Israel do whatever it wanted while at the same time giving the Arabs a free hand. Israel, feeling negative vibes from both the U.S. and the Arabs, did not feel like it was safe to make concessions dictated by outside powers. Instead of uniting the Arabs and Israelis around Iran, Obama has divided them on peace issues. The U.S. is now perceived in Israel as a bully, in the Arab states as weak, Israel and the U.S. are in dangerous waters, and meanwhile Iran marches on unscathed. This is what I call a foreign policy disaster.

The gap between the two sides’ positions is not that great in theory. In the Times article above, Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat reaffirms his side’s commitment to land swaps that will accomodate some Israeli settlers. On the Israeli side, Netanyahu’s demands for demilitarization and a temporary continued Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley are no more stringent than Ehud Barak’s generous offers at Taba in 2001.

The problem is domestic politics. Aggressive military postures have brought Israel much better short- and medium-term security than have peaceful gestures. (Operation Cast Lead and the Israel-Hizballah war of 2006 are often deemed strategic losses in the West, but rocket attacks have all but disappeared after the conclusion of each conflict.) And in the territories, Palestinian negotiators have taken Obama’s early moves to give them cover for initially maximalist positions. (Never before has a halt to settlement building been a precondition to direct talks.) Palestinians are either not willing or not able (or both) to give Israel anything as a reward for whatever demands it meets.

Thus Israel, by providing security for itself rather than relying on the intransigent and incapable Palestinian Authority, has strangely weakened its negotiating position — and its interest in a grand peace bargain. Most Israelis are fairly content to let the status quo persist, meaning Netanyahu will have to take home a big prize of some sort if the Israeli public is going to let him make historic concessions. This is not going to happen. These talks will fizzle out, and I’m sorry to say that the two-state solution is as far from reality as ever.

UPDATE: See Laura Rozen’s excerpt from Israeli columnist Nahum Barnea’s smart take on the matter.

In Cheney’s opinion, clearly, the Bush administration lost its nerve in the second term. (When, not coincidentally, Cheney’s nemesis, Condoleezza Rice, became secretary of State, and shifted power over foreign policy away from the White House). In 2003, the Bush administration abandoned waterboarding. In 2006, it closed the “black sites” around the world where detainees were held beyond the reach of any law. Throughout Bush’s second term, his administration released prisoners from Guantanamo Bay. And in Bush’s final days in office, according to David Sanger of the New York Times, he refused Israeli pleas for help in taking military action against Iran.

It’s almost as if there have been three presidencies since 9/11: 1) The Cheney administration (2001-2003 or 2004), in which the vice president—aided by his old friend Donald Rumsfeld, and his key aides Scooter Libby and David Addington—got Bush to pursue a war on terror largely outside the law. 2) The Bush administration (2004-2009), in which Bush, aided by Rice, Robert Gates, chief of staff Joshua Bolton, and the rulings of the supreme court, reign in Cheney and some of his policies. And 3) the Obama administration, which tries to bring Bush’s second term policies even more under the rule of law.

I doubt the U.S. or Israel will ever preventively attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. The costs are simply too big and too lasting, with considerable risk of a counterproductive outcome. But Kristol doesn’t see Obama’s avoidance of war through sanctions as anything but wrongheaded. He quotes an Obama official unapprovingly who said “[sanctions are] about driving [Iranians] back to negotiations, because the real goal here is to avoid war.” For shame.

Yep, the same Bill Kristol as before. Vague about policy to the point of self-parody, instead preferring to hide behind slogans like “expressing solidarity” with the Iranian people; overoptimistic about the involvement of America in a region that believes America needs to step back; making decisions based on faith-based rather than reality-based assessments; interested only in punishing or overthrowing rogue actors and not in seeing if their behavior can be changed. Some anti-war protestor.

Some might argue that this pressure-Israel-first approach is fine, since the process has resulted in positive Israeli steps towards the Palestinians. But they are missing the larger picture; the process was designed primarily to get Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table. In this respect, Obama’s policy has been a complete failure.

Only now that Netanyahu has spent a full year offering unilateral concessions to an intransigent Abbas is the pressure building on Palestinians to deliver in kind. Finally, finally, Abbas has accepted to start indirect negotiations with Netanyahu’s government:

The start of the indirect negotiations will mark the first time the Palestinians will hold political exchanges with Israel since Netanyahu became prime minister a year ago. However, it is a major step backward in terms of the contacts between Israel and the Palestinians, as it marks the first time in 16 years that talks held between the two will not be direct.

The talks will initially be held at low levels, in an effort to map out the two sides’ positions and establish an agenda of topics to be discussed if the talks are upgraded into full-fledged political negotiations.

The fact that the talks are low-level is OK. Raising expectations is always dangerous, and there are certain things that could be addressed fairly easily in initial talks that would build up momentum for more difficult discussions. Still, it has taken 12 months for Obama to persuade Abbas even to talk to an Israeli government official. This is surely not what pressure-Israel-first supporters had in mind.

Where I disagree is emblematic perhaps of classic IR theory debates on the nature of regimes. I think he too easily gives up on the upside of regime change since he doesn’t advocate its external imposition. He says: “The reformists [are not] likely to radically reshape the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. . . . Iranians may disagree about their internal political system, but we cannot assume this will transform their foreign affairs.”

That Iranian foreign policy will remain the same under reformists is true to the extent that no Iranian regime will behave exactly like we want it to behave. But we don’t have to demand that outcome, nor expect it, to recognize the benefits of a more cooperative Iranian government. What we want from Iran above all is transparency of their nuclear program. We don’t need them to stop enriching uranium; we just need to know that it’s being used for peaceful purposes. This limited objective might be achievable under a friendlier ruler.

Dan seems to believe that even reformists would pursue a nuclear weapons strategy for its deterrent power. This is a possibility. On the other hand, a more conciliatory Iranian regime might be able to feel secure without nuclear weapons. Certainly if the Iranians made their program open for full inspection and limited it to civilian use, the U.S. could offer Iran security guarantees it has long sought. A regime that was more open to the West and to the diplomatic process could reach such a kind of detente. It would be far from a national security panacaea, but it would I think there would be a clear benefit.

I’m glad to see you’re doing a little series on this, because I think your analysis is valid but incomplete. I agree that at this juncture, an Israeli attack — especially if not conducted with American help — would be unwise. You’ve highlighted the logistical challenges involved and the consequences. They are formidable.

Just how long is the Iranian fuse?

American and Israeli policy is not static, though. Now that Iran has backed off from its agreement in Geneva, the sanctions track is getting under way again. Sanctions could be much more effective than we thought even a few months ago, given three developments:

1. The discovery (or rather, disclosure) of the Qom enrichment facility. It crystallized the urgency to change Iranian behavior, perhaps even on Russia.

2. Internal Iranian unrest. The people are unhappy with the regime, and their grievance will only rise if they feel that the regime has further isolated the country. The Iranian government responds well to pressure when they feel the regime’s survival is at stake.

3. Technical setbacks in uranium enrichment. The number of centrifuges in Natanz is down 20%, possibly due in part to Western sabotage. With the nuclear timeline running longer and the regime timeline possibly running shorter, the urgency for military action eases.

As a result, former skeptics of sanctions are a little more willing to give them a go:

Another administration official said that Israeli officials, while still publicly hinting that they might take military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, “now feel that what’s happening in Iran makes the country vulnerable to real sanctions,” and might give Mr. Obama more time to persuade China and Russia to go along. A senior Israeli diplomat in Washington said that in back-channel conversations “Obama has convinced us that it’s worth trying the sanctions, at least for a few months.”

In other words, military action is not necessarily a favorable or unfavorable option by nature. It is currently an unfavorable option.