GW Discourse

John Mearsheimer recently gave a lecture at the University of Sydney with a blunt and pessimistic assessment of Sino-American relations, one that should seem very familiar to those who have read his magnum opus, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Mearsheimer argues that the likelihood of military confrontation between the United States and China is rising heavily, and that this risk, or perhaps even inevitability, is inherent in the structure of today’s international system.

China wants what the US has – hegemony in its own region. Unfortunately for the Chinese, Asian states and external powers with Asian interests will prove far less compliant or susceptible to Chinese domination than the Latin American states were to American rule. The US, for its own part, will attempt to frustrate and undermine this rise, and in the process further Chinese suspicions about America’s intentions. As Mearsheimer says, America should be acting like a status quo power, but given its proclivity for interventions in support of its geopolitical interests, humanitarian and liberal-democratic values, it is easy to see why Beijing would mistake it for a revisionist power. The view of China in the United States has similarly shifted from one of a power relatively satisfied with high economic growth within a region dominated by the American military to less optimistic recognition of China’s wish to assert its newfound power in the international system.

When Mearsheimer outlined this argument at the close of his book in 2001, China was far weaker, the US was predominant and the events of September 11th shoved great power politics into the background of US foreign policy. Both the governing administration and its main political opponents had comparatively little interest in the idea of a confrontation with China, regardless of whether an academic’s theory deemed such an event nearly inevitable or not. Today, his arguments are more relevant than we might like. The failure to establish a working relationship between the PLA and the US military, Hillary Clinton’s declaration against China’s maximalist approach to territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and the publication of a long-delayed Pentagon report on the Chinese military all point to very tense times for the Asia-Pacific ahead.

Of course, there are plenty of political incentives for the US to treat this as a shocking new development or an aberration from the norm. For the Obama administration, portraying China’s intentions as revisionist and aggressive will help paper over the failure of the administration’s National Security Strategy to integrate China as a cooperative partner on security issues. The administration will not have to acknowledge that there are major structural reasons for great powers not to coöperate on issues involving what they consider their “core national interest” and that not all countries think preserving an American-led rules based order is worth forgoing the opportunity to take advantage of US overstretch or decline, instead, they can blame it on China’s inability to recognize “shared interests” and embrace the new global century. For administration opponents, it is an opportunity to paint the administration as weak on defense and foreign policy, while the budget warriors fighting for the US Air Force and Navy will have a better case for pushing back against Gates’s proposed cuts.

The reason to keep Mearsheimer’s lecture in mind is not to demonize China, however – quite the opposite. Mearsheimer reminds us that material circumstances and international structure will compel the Chinese to behave as a reasonable great power would – to dominate their own region and prevent a foreign hegemon from interfering in their own. The defensive-offensive conundrum that Mearsheimer notes on Chinese military growth applies equally to the US military, which can inflict far more pain on China’s core national interests than China can on America’s. So too should we keep in mind that efforts to contain or balance against China will contribute to Chinese fears and the desire for military buildup. Indeed, a National Security Strategy that succeeds in fostering strong military partnerships under American leadership that cannot accommodate China’s growing interests is going to look a lot like an American attempt to prevent China’s rise. So, given that Southeast Asian arms purchases have doubled, and the US has courted alliances all along China’s major Sea Lines of Communication, we should not be surprised China’s strategic moves are becoming less about economic influence and more about the political power to prevent rival states from neutralizing that commercial wealth. China has embraced Mahan as America did – as it rises economically among powerful rivals with maritime supremacy. Mearsheimer emphasizes that China would be strategically wise to pursue this path:

Are they more principled than Americans are? More ethical? Are they less nationalistic than Americans? Less concerned about their survival? They are none of these things, of course, which is why China is likely to imitate the United States and attempt to become a regional hegemon.

Of course, we may not live in a world where Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism rules. Waltzian Defensive Realists are not as worried, nor are those adhering to Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory. Neorealism in general, with its strong emphasis on international structure, faces plenty of criticism from other realists and the broader IR community. But for policymakers, Mearsheimer’s perspective should provide some sobering lessons. Whatever the status of particular flash-points, the successes or pitfalls of diplomatic summits, or the rhetorical content of each state’s public diplomacy, the US must bear in mind the inherent dangers of the present international structure. The National Security Strategy is just a variation on an old theme – the US acting as a revisionist power to fashion a better world order under American leadership. The rise of China should realign our concerns with our interests as a status quo power – and keep us mindful that we are moving towards a balance of power where tragedy is possible.