GW Discourse

Another response to Dan Trombly, who’s done a wonderful job walking us through American policy implications in Iran. Dan’s basic gist — with which I agree — is that regime change as a way of resolving the nuclear issue is more fantasy than strategy. (On my tumblr account I’ve dissected the Mousavizadeh article he links to.)

Where I disagree is emblematic perhaps of classic IR theory debates on the nature of regimes. I think he too easily gives up on the upside of regime change since he doesn’t advocate its external imposition. He says: “The reformists [are not] likely to radically reshape the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. . . . Iranians may disagree about their internal political system, but we cannot assume this will transform their foreign affairs.”

That Iranian foreign policy will remain the same under reformists is true to the extent that no Iranian regime will behave exactly like we want it to behave. But we don’t have to demand that outcome, nor expect it, to recognize the benefits of a more cooperative Iranian government. What we want from Iran above all is transparency of their nuclear program. We don’t need them to stop enriching uranium; we just need to know that it’s being used for peaceful purposes. This limited objective might be achievable under a friendlier ruler.

Dan seems to believe that even reformists would pursue a nuclear weapons strategy for its deterrent power. This is a possibility. On the other hand, a more conciliatory Iranian regime might be able to feel secure without nuclear weapons. Certainly if the Iranians made their program open for full inspection and limited it to civilian use, the U.S. could offer Iran security guarantees it has long sought. A regime that was more open to the West and to the diplomatic process could reach such a kind of detente. It would be far from a national security panacaea, but it would I think there would be a clear benefit.