GW Discourse

As promised, this post will examine the next “harshest” method for dealing with Iran, and that is making “democracy promotion,” which is a more polite way of saying “regime change,” not merely preference but our leading strategy for dealing with Iran. With the assassination of Mousavi’s nephew and the Ashura unrest, it is clear that the “Green” movement in Iran still lives. To what end is another matter. Advocates of democracy promotion, like those of any major policy option, are a divided camp. Some, such as Nader Mousavizadeh argue that sanctions or any other pursuit of an end to the Iranian nuclear program will fail and strengthen Khamenei and Ahmadinejad’s hold. Others believe that sanctions will aid the process of democratization by finally choking off the regime. Yet others believe aerial bombardment could topple Tehran. Most, however, hold common assumptions – that the Iranian state is unstable or vulnerable, that its regime and ideology are the predominant threat, and that the West can either rely on or affect regime change.

All three assumptions have some merit, but the future is unknowable, and history, our best (but still inadequate) guide to it, leads me to question all of them. Firstly, police states can and too often do endure without “the street” on their side. Burma survived even after shooting Buddhist monks in the street, for example. Nor does Tehran need stand in its people’s favor. Yes, 1989 happened, the other “color revolutions” happened, but the success of those revolutions owes much to the reluctance of governments to fire on their own people and the broader decline of the communist world. Iran is not facing the same sort of economic and geopolitical stress, and it seems willing to pull triggers. Twitter and Youtube could change things, but how much?

Secondly, Iran’s ideology is not the source of its threat, nor are the reformists likely to radically reshape the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. Mousavi has been more part of the Islamic Republic’s establishment than Ahmadinejad, his tenure as Prime Minister throughout the 1980s bore Khomeini’s explicit stamp of approval. As PM he appointed many Iranian diplomats, including those involved in the 1983 Beirut bombing and Hezbollah’s formation. He also was important to the Iran-Contra negotiations. He is no inherent friend of the West, but an opportunist whose grievances have historically been with Khamenei, not the Islamic Republic and its foreign policy agenda. He is not revolting against the foreign policy he pursued as PM. Iranians may disagree about their internal political system, but we cannot assume this will transform their foreign affairs. Iran, by virtue of its economy, culture, military strength, and geography, feels entitled to more regional power, modern technology ( including a nuclear program), and greater sovereignty in pursuit of this goal. There is nothing particularly ideological about this view, and were Iran not an “Islamic Republic” there would be less temptation to assume otherwise. Iranians disagree about the subversion of internal political processes, the presidency those processes have wrought, and the consequent socioeconomic disappointments.

India, more democratic than anything Mousavi or Khatami dreams of, developed and militarized its nuclear program out of national pride, rational interest, and fear of its neighbors. Iran has similar reasons. With US forces in the Gulf, Central Asia, and the Arab world for the most part against it, Iran has no shortage of enemies. Even advocates of a peaceful nuclear program are unlikely to accept foreign meddling, and the Iranian security establishment will likely push for a bomb anyway, or at least breakout capability.

Finally, the United States cannot bring about regime change or passively rely on it to further its policy goals. Nor is waiting advisable. US attempts to foment regime change will only reinforce Iran’s intransigence, if not retaliatory meddling by the IRGC. Green politicians remember 1953 and want none of it. US support would likely split the movement along pro and anti-Western lines, and if it then succeeded, a 1979-style purge of any “dangerous” democrats in the revolutionary coalition would be in order. Conversely, US attempts to lend only the least provocative of kind words and deeds for the revolution, in hopes it will eventually succeed, will not constitute a strategy, they are just a gamble on history. The IRGC might lose the streets to barricades, but it will not lose the reactors or enrichment centrifuges to the Green Wave. They may well have nuclear capability before the culmination of a successful revolution, which they could use to prevent external interference. Even if the government fell, those fearing a handover to terrorist groups should be very concerned about what the IRGC would do with nuclear technology and materials if a new government threatened to shut the program down and rein in the Corps.

Long story short: Democratization is not counter-proliferation.