In the Winter 2009 issue of GW Discourse, in an article about corruption in the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai’s government, I argued that the level of corruption in the government not only served to de-legitimize the government because the people lack confidence in its ability to govern, but also because, contrary to intuition, the Afghan people won’t view the government as “serious” without a seal of approval of the US government. Now, this approval has been pretty difficult for the Karzai government to gain, especially when many governments around the world were outwardly hoping for Karzai to lose the recent Presidential Elections.
A recent article in the Washington Post delved into the personal dynamics of the relationships Karzai has built with the United States and argued that the tough approaches the US has taken in its endeavors with other countries may not work in Afghanistan. The article noted that “[Obama's] top diplomats and generals are abandoning for now their get-tough tactics with Karzai and attempting to forge a far warmer relationship. They recognize that their initial strategy may have done more harm than good, fueling stress and anger in a beleaguered, conspiracy-minded leader whom the U.S. government needs as a partner.” A common theme in US-led partnerships throughout the Middle East is, (on the foreign country’s part) a desire to feel independent but also to feel that the US will not abandon it.
At this point in his presidency, Karzai knows that he needs the support of the United States to make any kind of progress in nation-building, and the United States knows that he must be engaged and appeased (to some extent) in order to achieve any kind of “success”. But this involves a lot more understanding on both sides of the relationship, acknowledgment that Karzai, though President, really doesn’t maintain that much power, and that the US is not willing to let Karzai get away with corruption.
Connecting back to my argument in the article, at this point in time in Afghanistan, where legitimacy is gained through international support instead of actual policies and change, US support is key to help Afghans view the government as a legitimate force in the country. Though this logic seems a bit cyclical, more international support would seem to many to decrease legitimacy (and it actually may), it is what Karzai needs to feel confident in his own actions.
But the problem is that the more softer you are on Karzai, the closer he gets to Taliban and Iran. There should be no compromise on democracy and the wishes of Afghan people. You know during his recent visit to Kandahar, people told Karzai that the government is as much a problem for them as Taliban. I am sure neither Afghans nor the international community wants to support a problem instead of a government. If Karzai needs support, he should immediately act against war criminals, war lords in his cabinet and family, and corruption in the whole system.