Of the many issues on President Obama’s agenda, the train wreck in slow motion that is the Iranian nuclear crisis looms near the top. The one year deadline for the “outstretched hand” that was announced shortly after his inauguration is fast approaching, and as the Economist describes in a pointed article about the situation, Obama’s strenuous diplomacy has resulted in zero concessions so far. An enrichment exchange deal tentatively worked out with Iran in late September was seen as a test of whether the great powers might be able to coax the mullahs into a broader accord in the near future, where they could trade bomb-making technologies for economic benefits on a grander scale.
That test failed with the collapse of the deal and Iran’s vocal defiance of the recent I.A.E.A resolution to halt construction of the once-secret enrichment facility at Qom, outed by Western intelligence days before America and company sat down with the Islamic Republic for their doomed bargaining summit in Geneva. In Tehran, President Ahmadinejad happily slaps the international community in the face with a declaration o
f plans (however farfetched) for ten more enrichment plants. In Jerusalem, Prime Minister Netanyahu eyes strike scenarios nervously. In Washington, opposition pundits and politicians can’t help but think their criticisms of a “naïve” White House as vindicated.
Not quite. The first direct US-Iranian engagement in thirty years has failed to win concessions from the Iranians, but diplomacy has still payed off for America, and could yet pay more. The hope was that the regime across the table might genuinely respond to the right incentives from a more conciliatory America if internal political dynamics were favorable. But the reality was always that after its historic overture, those sitting next to America on the same side of the table would be more willing (or more likely) partners if and when it became apparent that real punitive action was inevitable in the form of sanctions and beyond.
This certainly goes for the Europeans whose support is usually taken for granted. Concerted diplomacy having run its course with America in the lead, it will be easier for Brown (or Cameron), Sarkozy, and Merkel to stand behind Obama and in front of their own people at the same time, wherever the standoff ultimately leads. The ball is now in Iran’s court and Iranian intentions made plain, with only the most deluded critics able to argue that bullheaded American saber-rattling is the source of Iranian intransigence. A similar principle applies for the Russians and Chinese, whose degree of commitment to sanctions is still less a failure on the administration’s part than a crucial work in progress (both countries voted with the West to condemn Iran in the I.A.E.A resolution, the first in three years and a rare consensus). If they can be led to conclude by a more nuanced US approach that their business interests must take a backseat to global security, Obama will have achieved a great deal.
