GW Discourse

The Wall Comes Down-November 1989

Twenty years ago, as the Berlin Wall was coming down and Eastern Europe was freeing itself of Soviet hegemony, an obscure academic named Francis Fukayama published an essay that would epitomize the spirit of the times:

“What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of Foreign Affairs’ yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run.”

After its publication (the essay was later expanded into a book in 1992), “End of History” became one of those few bits of polisci discourse to break out of the ivory tower and go mainstream, alternately praised and rejected as observers seek ordering principles for era that seems to relish in chaos and unpredictability. A generation later, are we still at the end of history?

Yes — it’s just taking longer than was thought in 1989. Key to understanding why are three fundamental assumptions in the essay: that the end of history is meant to be an eventual rather than immediate reality, that for all practical purposes this “end” (the spread and triumph of democracy) is determined by the character of the great powers rather than impotent “outpost” states, and that the “vanguard” of democracy is often economic rather than political liberalization.

Thus, critics’ assertion that Islamic fundamentalism represents a viable alternative to liberal democracy on the order of fascism and communism in the twentieth century is wrong, because the ideology is inherently limited in its spread to areas with Muslim-majority populations where the religion is deeply ingrained in history and culture (even then, extremist interpretation is almost always in the minority). Moreover, there are no Islamic fundamentalist great powers. The Iranian theocracy is a miserable failure and the Taliban ride horses; the most economically successful and influential “fundamentalist” state is by far Saudi Arabia, still hopelessly far from great powerdom.

The second claim against the end of history is the more serious “China model” of economic opening without political liberalization, free markets without the free society set in motion by reforms from the late 70s to the present. China is now the world’s second-largest economy and continues to grow as global capitalism, industry and modernization meet a population of 1.3 billion, and its burgeoning GDP allows the government to pour billions back into education, infrastructure, technological research and development, and the military. The “Communist” Party pays lip service to its Marxist heritage while welcoming wealthy business owners and entrepreneurs; its legitimacy is based on the ability to ensure continued growth and strategic appeals to Chinese nationalism (as with the Taiwan issue). Dissent from the party line is illegal, censorship of politically “dangerous” material widespread, and protest (of which there are thousands per year, mostly in rural areas) is crushed.

Does this authoritarian capitalist paradigm constitute a broad challenge to liberal democracy? If the CCP can maintain it deep into the twenty first century, then maybe, but that would require the Chinese on the whole to be somehow resistant to the prolonged effects of globalized capitalism and economic development that in a mere twenty years have already transformed their country, and that transformation is far from complete. Twenty years from now, the number of people in the country’s middle class (by Chinese income standards) will exceed the total population of the EU today. The likelihood that the Party can incorporate so many of these people—the new bourgeoisie—into the existing power structure and maintain stability without opening itself to some public debate and tolerance of basic rights characteristic of an emerging democratic order appears slim to none. The capitalist autocracy of the present is not a finalized “alternative” but an intermediary stage of transition for a very big country.