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With the midterms vastly approaching, many commentators have noted the relative absence of foreign policy from the usual debates. This is not too surprising: despite the public controversy over the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, they have little to do with our economic woes, and since such a small percentage of our country is involved in the military generally, their relative importance has faded. When unemployment is over 9%, it does not take a PhD in political science to predict domestic issues are going to dominate the scene.

Nevertheless, one country has taken plenty of flak in the midterm brouhaha: the People’s Republic of China. What it reveals should make most economists uncomfortable and international relations theorists nervous.

First, take this ad from government spending-watchdog Citizens Against Government Waste:

And don’t worry, lest you think this is a phenomenon of the right:

Mercantilism, it seems, is back and season. Economists such as Paul Krugman have always been on China’s case for its currency manipulation, though Paul Kennedy argues the unintended consequences of such currency crusading may be more deleterious to our wider economic position than we expect.

We have entered a new phase of economic great gamesmanship, however: the world’s first global clean energy trade war appears to be already erupting. What it exposes, of course, is the hypocrisy and inconsistency of most political logic about international trade – Bryan Caplan should be satisfied.

Firstly, if US politicians are really so adamant about not signing onto clean energy and carbon reduction pacts if China and India will not do the same, then we should probably not be going after their efforts to subsidize or favor their own developments in green energy – particularly given the amount of government largesse available to green entrepreneurs in the United States today (and it would only get higher if many pundits had their way).

Secondly, those who fret about Chinese ownership of US debt should calm down – that debt ownership does not easily translate into leverage, as the Fletcher School and Foreign Policy’s Dan Drezner points out. Another concern, however, is that our debt might grow so large that China is no longer interested in absorbing our excess. Economic historian Niall Ferguson pointed this out a year ago, and currently Chinese purchases of American T-bonds are lower than their mid-decade heights. If the American economy becomes truly abysmal, the PRC will be looking to decouple, not buy out a failing state. Financial deterrence will keep the US from lording over China, but most of the policies it deters are policies we would not be wise in pursuing anyway (like trying to manage China’s Tibet and Xinjiang policies).

As in most serious economic downturns, a foreign country is taking some of the heat. But not all of it is undeserved xenophobia. China’s ham-fisted rare earth metals policy is likely to backfire. Already, the US is pondering its legal options, and after using its “rare earth weapon” against Japan over the Senkaku Islands dispute and achieving mixed results at best, its unclear if a wider policy will help or harm China in the long run. This excellent document explains the rare earth power struggle, and reminds the West that viable options outside China do exist, providing other wealthy countries are willing to invest in them. China’s neighborly rivalries have also prompted concern from advanced resource-dependent economies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. They might form the basis of a logical geo-economic balancing coalition.

National rivalry and economic interdependence are rarely a good combination. While the economic logic of free trade still generally holds, it will certainly become less convincing, especially as China rises. World War I is the cliché example of interdependent economies going to war. Increasingly wary of relative power shifts, voters in the US may decide that the economic cost of protectionist and Sinophobic economic policies are worth the perceived geopolitical gain of relative power decline. While economic interdependence will hardly pave the way to a peaceful Pacific, demonizing it is unlikely to serve America’s long-term interests. Not only do these sort of ads distort international economics and US-Chinese relations, they distract from the real and much more complex economic problems the US is facing today.

BERLIN – When President Yanukovych talked to German business leaders and statesmen at the Hotel Adlon about new partnerships between Ukraine and the E.U., there was something missing from his speech – the European Union.

Yanukovych spoke for nearly forty minutes on Ukraine’s trade relationship with Germany, his efforts to fight corruption, and his new Finnish boathouse. He paused once to mention E.U. membership. The next day he was on a flight to Beijing, where he signed investment deals worth over $4 billion.

There may have been a lot of chatter over Merkel’s cool reception of Yanukovych. Not many noticed that Yanukovych’s embrace of Europe was equally reserved. While he confirmed that Ukrainians seek E.U. membership, he also made it clear that E.U. membership was not his top concern. Ukraine will be looking Far East, not near West.

The Beijing trip sent a clear message to Berlin. Ukraine will remain open for business with Germany and Europe. But that relationship will not be exclusive. Moscow and Beijing will have an equal share. Most importantly, economic ties do not mean privileges for Europe when it comes to influencing Kyiv’s domestic affairs.

After his speech, the president was asked directly about his country’s future in the E.U. While he acknowledged an increasingly large number of Ukrianians support E.U. membership, Yanukovych also delcared his approach Euro-Pragmatist, not Euro-Romantic. “First we must build Europe in Ukraine,” he replied.

In the past, that approach suited Germany just fine. Germany hoped that a climate of economic security, combined with trade interests, could passively encourage democracy. Business has become the bottom line in Germany’s approach to East Europe.

“The East is Germany’s Middle East – that’s where they get their energy from,” said Asle Toje, author of The European Union as a Small Power. “These are experienced statesmen who are very cautious about pursuing any policy that could tilt the equilibrium in a way that would not favor German interests.”

Those interests include Germany’s economic ties with Russia, a relationship Toje says Germany is not willing to jeopardize for democratic crusading. The E.U. wed itself to the Orange Revolution in 2004. After a disappointing term led to defeat at the polls, Germany in particularly regrets backing the wrong horse.

Democratic crusading is one thing, but a modern, prosperous Ukraine where journalists continue to disappear should not be an option. Modernization and investment has long been seen as a back door to democracy. It’s the founding principle of the Eastern Partnership. This principle needs to be re-examined.

“Building Europe in Ukraine” isn’t simply a matter of replicating the Eiffel tower in Lviv, or making a leaning tower of Kyiv. You can’t have Europe without Europeans: A well-informed, well-educated citizenry with a clear investment in their society’s success. Money alone does not lead the individual to happiness, and neither is it the solution to the development of a successful society. Yanukovych has had trouble realizing that good governance can also be good for business.

In fact, Yanukovych’s domestic policies cost him political capital in Europe. One of the reasons the Berlin trip was unsuccessful was because Yanukovych can not understand why his policies toward civil society evoke such large concerns from Europe, argues Lukasz Adamski, an analyst at the Polish Institute for International Affairs.

“The German government is not naïve. They do not expect the Party of Regions to be a party of democrats. They are concerned with exerting pressure on Yanukovych so that the situation in Ukraine does not deteriorate.”

It’s no secret that Yanukovych prefers his trade made in China – with no strings attached. As Ukraine’s political ties head East with its president, Berlin’s tactic of encouraging democracy through development may become dated. European business ties may no longer be sufficient tools to reign in illiberal behavior. If Yanukovych manages to substitute Beijing for Berlin, Ukraine may find itself a Europe without Europeans.

John Mearsheimer recently gave a lecture at the University of Sydney with a blunt and pessimistic assessment of Sino-American relations, one that should seem very familiar to those who have read his magnum opus, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Mearsheimer argues that the likelihood of military confrontation between the United States and China is rising heavily, and that this risk, or perhaps even inevitability, is inherent in the structure of today’s international system.

China wants what the US has – hegemony in its own region. Unfortunately for the Chinese, Asian states and external powers with Asian interests will prove far less compliant or susceptible to Chinese domination than the Latin American states were to American rule. The US, for its own part, will attempt to frustrate and undermine this rise, and in the process further Chinese suspicions about America’s intentions. As Mearsheimer says, America should be acting like a status quo power, but given its proclivity for interventions in support of its geopolitical interests, humanitarian and liberal-democratic values, it is easy to see why Beijing would mistake it for a revisionist power. The view of China in the United States has similarly shifted from one of a power relatively satisfied with high economic growth within a region dominated by the American military to less optimistic recognition of China’s wish to assert its newfound power in the international system.

When Mearsheimer outlined this argument at the close of his book in 2001, China was far weaker, the US was predominant and the events of September 11th shoved great power politics into the background of US foreign policy. Both the governing administration and its main political opponents had comparatively little interest in the idea of a confrontation with China, regardless of whether an academic’s theory deemed such an event nearly inevitable or not. Today, his arguments are more relevant than we might like. The failure to establish a working relationship between the PLA and the US military, Hillary Clinton’s declaration against China’s maximalist approach to territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and the publication of a long-delayed Pentagon report on the Chinese military all point to very tense times for the Asia-Pacific ahead.

Of course, there are plenty of political incentives for the US to treat this as a shocking new development or an aberration from the norm. For the Obama administration, portraying China’s intentions as revisionist and aggressive will help paper over the failure of the administration’s National Security Strategy to integrate China as a cooperative partner on security issues. The administration will not have to acknowledge that there are major structural reasons for great powers not to coöperate on issues involving what they consider their “core national interest” and that not all countries think preserving an American-led rules based order is worth forgoing the opportunity to take advantage of US overstretch or decline, instead, they can blame it on China’s inability to recognize “shared interests” and embrace the new global century. For administration opponents, it is an opportunity to paint the administration as weak on defense and foreign policy, while the budget warriors fighting for the US Air Force and Navy will have a better case for pushing back against Gates’s proposed cuts.

The reason to keep Mearsheimer’s lecture in mind is not to demonize China, however – quite the opposite. Continue Reading »

Writing today in Slate, Christopher Hitchens notes the recent flurry of press speculation over the supposedly imminent Israeli military response to the ominous tick-tock of the Iranian nuclear program. Prime Minister Netanyahu and much of the rest of the country’s political-military elites are apparently agreed on the “existential” nature of the threat a bomb in Tehran poses to Tel Aviv (though perhaps not Jerusalem, as Hitchens points out). Hitchens then goes on to list “six more reasons” why Iran must be prevented from going nuclear at any cost. You can read them, and then read these reasons why Hitchens is full of (as they say in Tel Aviv) Harah.

1. The “stewardship” of the United Nations for actually preventing any conflict, anywhere in the world at any time in its 65 year history has been less than stellar; the UN usually does a decent job as a sort of multinational clean-up crew for after the wars have run their course (ceasefires, tents, aid packages, border monitors etc..). Now, it would be spectacular if preventative strikes against Iran were launched by a real multinational coalition (like this), but everyone knows that’s about as likely as, say, a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
2. Well, if the revolutionary guards are in control of Iran now anyway, what’s the difference?
3. So basically, Iranian proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah become untouchable, because Iran will resort to nuclear weapons every time Israeli planes strike rocket launchers in the Gaza strip or southern Lebanon. Because, you know, every time an American plane pounded the Vietcong, the Soviets and the Chinese hit us back with a nuclear weapon.
4. Certainly a nuclear-armed Iran might be inclined to act more aggressively toward America’s Arab allies in and around the Persian Gulf. In that case, the United States should increase its own military presence in the gulf (like we’re already doing) and help the gulf states bolster their own defenses (like we’re already doing) to shore up the entire region.
5. There will never be a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, but that’s what makes the rejectionists on both sides rejectionists. The whole process is rife with rejectionism already. That’s like saying if you shoot off a dead camel’s leg, then the poor thing won’t be able to walk.
6. Iran and North Korea having nuclear weapons is certainly a setback for proliferation, but not a fatal one; there are still fortysome countries that could go nuclear with relative ease, but choose not to because they simply see no benefit (security or otherwise) to doing so.

And we’re back from a brief hiatus!

It’s inescapable to conclude that Barack Obama’s foreign policy on Israel/Palestine has been bound for the foreseeable future by an over-eagerness to jumpstart the issue, before he’d gotten around a learning curve he didn’t expect. Call it naivete, arrogance, simple enthusiasm, or whatever, but his characteristic caution was thrown to the wind. Whereas he took months to decide his strategy for Afghanistan, he’s repeatedly and proudly pointed out that it took him only two days as POTUS to appoint a Special Middle East Envoy. (I’d bet National Security Advisor Jim Jones regrets calling this conflict the “epicenter” of American foreign policy.)

We have a truly strange set of facts on the ground in the Middle East. The most conservative Israeli government in 20 years has, at the request of an American administration, halted for 10 months any new settlement construction in the West Bank and curtailed it in Jerusalem. The West Bank’s economy and governance are improving, led by the moderate Mahmoud Abbas. Yet, the chances of peace are as low as ever.

The Obama Administration has been too eager for achievements to understand the price at which those small achievements come. For example, getting the prized settlement freeze took months of public fighting with Israeli PM Netanyahu, which undermined the trust of the Israeli public and disappointed Arabs by taking so long. Now that the focus is on direct talks and Abbas is being stubborn, Obama’s threatening to play hardball with the PA.

Considering the alternative — admitting temporary defeat — I understand the president’s dogged commitment to the issue. But when would he give up on a banner initiative that probably won’t even get the results he wants? The Middle East is apathetic and discouraged about peace.

And no, none of this is because of the Israel lobby.

As Dan has pointed out, McChrystal’s behavior was unacceptable. In situations like these, where the line between policy and strategy is nearly invisible, political statements such as McChrystal’s have grave implications for the conduct of war, particularly a counterinsurgency war where cooperation between the diplomats and White House officials is paramount to success. Adding to the strategic prudence of re-asserting the proper authority in civil-military relations was the political prudence of acting swiftly and decisively as a crisis emerged. President Obama’s epithet, from the Afghan strategy review to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, has been “dithering;” today we all know who is commander-in-chief and who is running the Afghan war.

As Dan points out, the first obvious parallel to this fiasco is Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur. However, there is a critical difference – that earlier firing redefined and clarified Korean strategy at a dire moment in the war. It was well that he did, for MacArthur’s inclinations would have turned the Korean War into the Chinese War, or worse. Truman stepped back from the abyss and, as any good reading of Clausewitz would instruct us, he reasserted the reason of state interest over the passion of a commander locked in the duel. If Obama had any doubts or second thoughts about the viability of McChrystal’s strategy, this was a wasted crisis. A switch to a commander more interested in, or at least more compliant with, a speedier withdrawal, a reduction of footprint or shift from counterinsurgency to counter-terrorism could not come at a better time than now. It is better to change strategy with the replacement of a strong-headed commander than to hope the recalcitrant follows along, and it is better to make such a replacement when replacement is inevitable, rather than during a heated strategy debate or humiliating battlefield defeat.

No, Obama did not just forgo the opportunity to change strategies, even after a time of rising casualties, questionable prospects for major offensives, revelations about mineral riches that augur more ill than good – he affirmed his commitment to counterinsurgency, replacing the disciple for the master, General David Petraeus. He could have simply elevated McChrystal’s deputy Lt. Gen. Dave Rodriguez to signal continuity. Instead, Obama went for the most popular, highest profile leader at hand. In choosing Petraeus, Obama has doubled down on population-centric counterinsurgency, and he has staked his reputation to its success, by taking the chief of Central Command and sending him to focus directly on the war in Afghanistan. By choosing a general with a sterling public image, one synonymous with the turnaround in Iraq, there is a risk that the war’s failures and mismanagements will fall on the civilian leadership, rather than the commander. If Obama did not fully own the war and the counterinsurgency strategy beforehand, he does now.

Petraeus is not a cure-all, however, as any counterinsurgent commander would recognize, the factors behind success are often beyond operational and tactical feats. First, we must recognize that by choosing counterinsurgency strategy and Petraeus, the civilian government will have the unpleasant task of rectifying the complaints McChrystal and aides enumerate in Rolling Stone. Continue Reading »

There are some things that are kind of expected not to happen if you’re a general in the U.S. Armed Forces. One of them is to have Rolling Stone get an all-access profile where you badmouth all of your civilian superiors and colleagues — including the Commander in Chief. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commanding general of NATO forces in Afghanistan, did just that. President Obama has summoned him to Washington, where hopefully McChrystal will be relieved of duty.

The instant analogy is during the Korean War, with Gen. Douglas MacArthur leading the UN force to defend South Korea. MacArthur publicly criticized President Harry Truman’s handling of the war effort throughout 1950 and early 1951. Then in March 1951, MacArthur undercut Truman’s efforts at negotiation with China by issuing his own ultimatum for Chinese surrender. Truman fired MacArthur two weeks later, after receiving a unanimous recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his civilian advisors.

McChrystal has not flouted presidential authority quite the way MacArthur did, but he already came fairly close last September when he wrote to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates of his recommendations on American strategy in Afghanistan — and then released the report to the public. Generals do not make policy; they advise, sure, and they execute the policy, but they do not shape the political atmosphere for the president. That incident alone would have been enough to reassign the General, but the Rolling Stone piece shows a disrespect for the proper order of command that is unfitting of a general and embarrassing to the President.

History has largely vindicated Truman. He said toward the end of his life, “I fired him because he wouldn’t respect the authority of the President. I didn’t fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that’s not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would be in jail.” McChrystal has not respected the authority of the president, and that’s grounds for removal.

On the 15th June, Horst Köhler officially vacated Palace Bellevue in Berlin. The former Federal President of Germany shocked the country on May 31st when he announced his resignation. He had been re-elected by the coalition under Angela Merkel and his second term should have lasted until 2014.

The rationale behind his resignation remains unclear, but the catalyst for it is quite apparent. In an interview with Deutschlandradio, the President outlined his perception of what Americans casually call ‘national interests’. He cited war and occupation together with civilian and military casualties as the means to ensure security and a healthy economy. In export-oriented Germany, such a statement, spoken in such a straightforward manner, could do nothing less than attract great criticism. Germany does not like to speak of anything in terms of ‘national interest’. The opposition subsequently launched accusations of ‘gun-boat diplomacy’ against President Köhler. While most had construed the message as directly legitimizing the forces in Afghanistan, Köhler later explained that he was referring to programs such as ‘Operation Atalanta’, which seek to combat piracy in Somalia. Defense Minister zu Guttenberg also joined the fray, citing that the involvement in Afghanistan is not a colonialist enterprise, but the result of a UN mandate to restore stability in the region. Nevertheless, within 10 days of the interview Köhler announced his decision to leave office.

Köhler enjoyed popularity among German citizens, even though many consider his resignation the wrong choice. He was not a politician and was considered above party politics. Yet, since his re-election in 2009, Köhler became ever-more isolated. In the last months of his presidency, as the Greek debt problem was truly spinning out of control, the former head of the International Monetary Fund was rarely consulted by Chancellor Merkel. In the wake of the global financial crisis and the weakening of the Euro, one might have expected that the expertise of such an economist would have been sought out.  Rather alone in Palace Bellevue, the great Counsellor had no one to console himself.

To resign after over five years in office over a single speech caught everyone off guard. Horst Köhler justified his decision based upon the disgrace that he brought to the honourable title of a Federal President. The media reported that, as an economist, he simply did not have the thick skin of a politician to weather the storm. And Angela Merkel stated that, while she could not agree with his decision, she could respect it.

During the tattoo in his honour last night – ironically perhaps the most military event one might see in Germany – former President Köhler was offered the chance to request a farewell song from the marching band. He chose the St. Louis Blues.

In a major speech fittingly he fittingly delivered from Abilene’s Eisenhower library, Robert Gates invoked that past President’s legacy in demanding a radical overhaul of procurement and how we think about our country’s military and budgetary priorities.

Military spending on things large and small can and should expect closer, harsher scrutiny.  The gusher has been turned off, and will stay off for a good period of time.

Gates mentions the most egregious and wasteful programs he hopes to kill, such as the prohibitively expensive and hardly useful F-35 alternate engine, or the C-17 transports the USAF does not even want, and reiterates his desire to seek a Presidential veto on any budget including these items. Gates did not shirk from controversy, however. He then declared:

Health-care costs are eating the Defense Department alive, rising from $19 billion a decade ago to roughly $50 billion – roughly the entire foreign affairs and assistance budget of the State Department.

Even single-payer systems are not immune to America’s health-care woes, it seems. Even with Gates’s sympathy and understanding for opposition to cost-saving measures involving the military’s health care system, it is still surprising to hear something that Gates admits arouses fury from Congress and veterans’ groups in a major speech. Gates also mentions the skyrocketing costs of weapons systems such as the DDG-1000 and B-2, though some have argued their “upward spiral” in costs actually stems from insufficiently large production runs.

One of Gates’s major targets however, is the bureaucratic structure of the DoD. He notes:

Consider the Department’s spending on operations and maintenance, a broad category that encompasses about $200 billion worth of the day-to-day activities of the military – from flight training to mowing the grass.   Over the last decade, spending in this area – not counting expenses directly related to the wars – has about doubled, with large increases in administrative and infrastructure support…

Another category ripe for scrutiny should be overhead – all the activity and bureaucracy that supports the military mission.  According to an estimate by the Defense Business Board, overhead, broadly defined, makes up roughly 40 percent of the Department’s budget.

During the 1990s, the military saw deep cuts in overall force structure – the Army by nearly 40 percent.  But the reduction in flag officers – generals and admirals – was about half that.  The Department’s management layers – civilian and military – and numbers of senior executives outside the services grew during that same period.

The increasingly bureaucratic nature of much of our defense spending is a serious problem indeed. With the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, laments about the insufficient size of available US ground forces were common from both opponents and proponents of the war. Yes, perhaps this was the logical outcome of a post-Cold War military – but Gates is absolutely correct about the senselessness of staffing and financing a huge amount of unnecessary staff at at time when the US military has to implement stop-loss programs to fight active wars.

Maintaining America’s military in a time of massive debt and economic stagnation is about more than cutting over-budget weapons systems. Like the hydra, the heads will grow back, because as long as the need or desire for modernizing the military remains and the refusal on the part of bureaucrats and legislators to cut down on costs endures, another program will come along later. Real, lasting change requires reversing the bureaucratization and sacrifice of tooth for tail, recognizing that America’s defense procurement is about more than how much it stimulates industry and whose state it stimulates industry in, and being willing to make the changes that follow from this recognition. Gates will be on his way out soon. If he can accomplish any of these goals, however, he may well be the most important Secretary of Defense in history.

If you didn’t have the chance to pick up Thursday’s BBC Election Night coverage you really missed one hell of a show. For all the joy we Americans seem to get from coloring swing states in red and blue, the British have taken this formula to a whole nother level, including the use of state of the art CGI technology to illustrate the steps to 10 Downing Street (the Prime Minister’s London residence) as the seats in Parliament, and a projection of the tally of seats onto the clocktower of Big Ben (skip to 2:15 to view the results in “all their glory”: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SyuEKoNEbnk). Can’t embed, sorry.

It certainly appears as if the next man to hold that house will be 43-year old Conservative party leader David Cameron, although he did not win the resounding mandate that the senior party leadership had hoped for, falling far short of the 326 seats needed for an outright majority. With 648 of 650 MPs elected, the Conservatives hold 305 seats (a gain of 97 seats), Labour 258 (managing to staunch some of the bleeding at the polls), and the Liberal Dems hold 57, losing five seats from the last Parliament in a highly underwhelming performance, although polls had indicated a surge in Party support after Nick Clegg’s dominant performance in the UK’s first ever televised debate between PM candidates. The BBC’s 10 o’clock exit poll, which received a rash of criticism at the time of its release, actually hit the seat totals almost right on the money, predicting the Conservatives would hold 307, Labour 255, and the Lib Dems 59.

What now? While, as I mentioned, the national swing of 5% from Labour to Conservative was not what Cameron had hoped, he now seems likely to lead the next government with a minority of seats, barring a deal with Nick Clegg (unlikely given their staunch ideological differences, particularly on immigration and economic issues) which Cameron has seemed to express openness toward that would push Cameron past the magic majority number of 326 (and Clegg himself has stated Cameron should have the first crack at forming the next government). After all, Angela Merkel’s ideologically diffuse “Grand Coalition” did last a couple of years in Germany, with decidedly mixed results. The Lib Dems were largely expected to have “Kingmaker” status in deciding whether the Conservatives or Labour were to take power, but voters on the left seemed to shy away from the rising party, fearing that their vote would contribute to a Conservative victory. Though Gordon Brown was not as soundly defeated as some expected, his chances of leading the next government are zilch, as Labour was defeated in the popular vote by over 2 million.

Will running a minority government, as Cameron probably expects to do, be dangerous in such a tenuous economic environment? That is the million dollar question of this election. Driving down the deficit, in Cameron’s estimation, will probably require drastic cost-cutting measures, hurting the prospects for British social programs that will not bode well with many fiscal liberals in Labour and the LDP. In this political situation, Cameron will have to run a centrist, compromising governments, which may irritate some right-wingers, although in Britain’s first-past-the-post system, it’s not like the have the choice to support anyone else. One of the EU’s great superpowers is certainly in for an interesting political future.

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